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•  •  4  7 SUMMARY 
The  ECSC  Treaty confers  on  the  Commission  the  task of  defining  the  General 
Objectives which  provide  guidance  on  the  development  of  the  steel  industry  1n 
the  Community.  This  guidance  takes  account  of  the  situation in  the  internal 
market,  the  state of  the  production installations,  constraints  imposed  by  the 
economic  situation and  the pressure of  international  competition. 
The  excess of  supply over  demand,  pushing  up  costs  and  causing prices 
to plunge  below  the break-even point  in many  companies,  and  the  cut-throat 
competition on  export markets  have  seriously.eroded  the  financial viability 
of  the European  steel  industry.  As  a  result the  Commission  has. had  to ·take 
a  number  of measures  designed  both  to  prevent  the  situation deteriorating 
into a  state of  anarchy  that  could  nullify the  very  concept  of  a  common  market 
(and  which  is  the  reason  behind  the measures  taken  pursuant  _to  Article  58 
of  the  ECSC  Treaty),  and  to  set  in  place. the  mechanisms  to  adapt  the  structure 
of  the  industry to  the  new  situation. 
The  strategy to  be  follo\ved  in  this process  of  change will  of  course  have  to  be 
realistic but  the  current  weakness  of  the  industry also  demands  a  positive 
orientation. 
It will  be  based  on 
an analysis  of  the  foreseeable  trends  in demand  from  the  main  user  sectors, 
in international  competition  and  i'n  production  techniques,  which  are  of 
vital  importance  in  this  context; 
examination of  the  factors  that will  l1elp  restore  economic  efficiency 
and  financial  viability  tp-~he companies  involved. 
The  structural nature  of  the  crisis 1s  obvious  from  the  foreseeable  development 
up  to  1985  of  the  factors  governing  the  industry's activity.  Beyond  1985 
forecasting  becomes  more  difficult  as  the macro-economic  factors  that  can  play 
an  important  role are  not  sufficiently well  defined  to  allow  their  impact  on 
the  steel  industry  to  be  properly  assessed;  however,  it already  seems  clear 
that  the  situation will  not  be  fundamentally  different  from  that  foreseen 
for  1985. 
The  foreseeable  balance  between  supply  and  demand  1s  still very unsatisfactory; 
despite  the  rationalization  that  has  alreacly  taken  place,  and,  also,  because  of 
the  improvements  made,  and  needed,  in productivity,  the  surplus  capacity  a!ready_ 
evident  in  1980 will  be  even  greater  in 1985,  if  the  present  stagnation  in  demand 
continues,  if  it  is not  substantially  reduced  by  the  policy of  restructuring  and 
the  application  of  the  aid  code. - II -
It~ould amount  to  about  29%  of  crude  steel  production capacity,  and  about33% 
of  finislwci  product  capacity,  figures  which  are  obviously  unacceptable  if  the 
industry  1s  to  be  economically viable  and  which  certainly  cannot  be  offset  by 
measures  to  control  the market. 
The  combination  of  low  econom1c  development  and  the  continuing  decline ln 
specific  steel  consumption  means. that  even  the  most  cautious  forecasts  made  up 
to  now  have  to  be  corrected  do~~~ards.  In,l985,  foreseeable  consumption  of 
finished  products  in  the  Community  is likely  to  be  around  92  million  tonnes 
For external  trade,  the  positive net  balance  of  trade  1n  ECSC  finished  products 
is  likely  to  remain  close  to  12  million  tonnes. 
Whether  expressed  in  terms  of quality or  price  of· the  products  passing  down  the 
\ 
chain of  industrial  production,  or  in  terms  of  the  relative yield  on  the 
capital  invested  in  plant  and  production,  the  persistance  of  inefficiency 
in  one  industrial  sector will  extend  its influcJJce  over  other  sectors 
hindering  their ability  to  adapt  and  thus  reducing  the  chances  of  a  general 
recovery. 
A  true  balance  can  be  achieved  c1nly  by  taking  parallel  and  interdependent 
action on  the  structures of  the  industry,  in  two  ways:  firstly,  modernization  and 
rationalization  to  increase  productivity  an~  increases  1n  the  production of  higher 
value  products,  and  secondly,  stopping  of  marginal  plant  so  as  to mobilize 
capital  and  eliminate  the  surplus  supply  th;Jt  has  repercussions  on  the  whole 
of  the  industry. 
Although  definite progress  has  been  made  in  the  way  of  productivity  and 
modernization  (l),  this  cannot  hear  its full  fruit  unless  the  closing  down  of 
marginal  plant  is carried  farther  than  it has  been  up  to  the  present,  or 
even  as  planned  in  the  restructuring  and  rcdcvcloprnent  projects  currently 
being  drawn  up  by  the  companies. 
The  stimulation of  this effort  js based  on  the  Hays  and  means  offered  by 
the  ECSC  Treaty  to  g1vc  new  impetus  to  an  industry  that  is vital  to  the 
. I. 
(1)  Conununication  froni  the  Commission  to  the  Council  on  the  steel  restructuring 
policies,  COM  (81)  67  final  of  25  Febru.:try  1981. - III -
in the .confex-t" of  an  integrated  internal  market~ 
Community, hn·.~~-~-r·t:i~n the  task  assigne~ by  the  EEC  Treaty calls  for  tighter 
----~·  ...  ~ 
_coordina~_ion ·between  the  steel policies  and  the  other conunon  policies  and 
activities.  The  latter have  focused  more  and  more  on  the need  to  continue 
the structural adjustment  to  the  new  economic  and  industrial  cont·ext,  as 
re-affirmed  in  the  Commission's  proposals  for  the  establishment  of  an 
industrial  strategy at  a  Community  ievel  (1). 
The  Commission  must  then  see  that  discipline 1s maintained  to  encourage  a 
J 
sense  of  common  purpose  directed  not  towards  conservation but  towards 
revitalizing the  system. 
To  this end,  competitivity is  the  ma1n  indicator in evaluating "the 
most  rational distribution of  production at  the  highest  possible  level of 
productivity"  in accordance  with Article  2  of  the  ECSC  Treaty.  It is by 
concentrating  resources  on  production  strong points  that  tl1e  essential 
improvement. in  the  average  competitiveness  of  the  Community  steel  industry· 
can be  attained. 
This  improvement  must  be  measured  against  realistic references  in  terms  of 
costs  and  prices.  Over  and  above  the  levels,  especially of  price~, 
set  in  support  of  the  restructuring effort,  i~  i~  necessary  to  take 
into account  the  reference -levels established  by  the  most  efficient  competitors. 
A new  policy must  be  established  around.the-se  economic  references: 
firstly by  the  companies  which  must  have  the  strength of  purpose  to 
bring about  the  convergence  of  strategies,  towards  an  adjustment  to  real 
demand; 
by  governments,  whose  inte-rvention must  be  1n  support  of  the  restructuring 
effort,  as  they  cannot  afford  to  pour  cash  into  supporting  a  fundamental 
structural  inefficiency; 
focussing  all  the  instruments  of  Community  cohesion  (crisis measures, 
·aid code,  financing,  commercial  policy,  regional  and  social  measures) 
more  closely  on  objectives  better  adapted  to the  needs  of  the  present  situation~ 
by  the  governments  and  the  Community  to  implement  reconversion  plans  which 
~r-e indispens·ible  for  employment  and  regional  development~ 
In  the  Commission's  view,  it  is under  these  conditions  that  the  possible  synergies 
between  the  different parties  involved  can  allow  a  defensive  sectoral  attituj~ to 
be  t.-.Jn5.{oe~rnecl  into  a  steel  strategy  com·merisurate  with  the  challanges  facing  it. 
(1)  COM  (81)  639  final/2  of  29  October  1981~ - 1  -
I. A REALISTIC  AND  POSITIVE  POLICY  TO  REVITALIZE  THE  STEEL  INDUSTRY 
1.  Realistjc  and  positive general  objectives 
General  objectives  for  steel based  on  a  forecast  of  falling  demand  might  well 
be  viewed  as  pessimistic  and  negative. 
This  impression must  be  cpuntercd  by  emphasizing  the nature  and  line  of 
approach of  this  document,  which  is  intended  to  be  both realistic  and  purposeful. 
To  be realistic,  any  analysis of  the  current  situation and  future  prospects 
must  take  into account: 
general  and  economic  constraints  and  tecl1nical  progress  in  the  industry, 
which  set  the  context  for  adaptation of  the  structure of  the  industry; 
the  interdependence  of  the  various  industrial  sector~which indicrites 
the  lines  to  be  followed  in  fitting the  steel  policy  into  an  industrial 
strategy; 
the  urgency  of  the  problems,  which  make  an  order  of  priority essential; 
the  scope  of  the  questions,  which  requires  the  range  of  action  to  be 
extended. 
In  the  turbulent  and  uncertain  econom1c  environment  of  the  1980s,  it is  not 
possible  to  be  both  realistic and  to  produce  at  the  same  time  highly detailed 
forecasts  looking  far  ahead,  and  valid  for·se~eral years. 
Rather,  experience  suggests  that it 1s  better to  make  fundamental  qualitative 
appraisals,  which  are  likely  to  re~ain valid  over  the  years,  but  which  themselves 
are  based  on  quantitative  analyses  which  are  progressively  reviewed.  In  any 
event,  sectora·  forecasts  obtained  in  this  way  can  give  no  more  than  the 
general  trend o:  the  economic  factors.  Thi~ will not  be  sufficient  and  will  l1ave 
to  be  backed  up  Ly  a  much  more  detailed  and  specific analysis,  which  must  be 
the responsibility of  the  company. 
Against  this  backgrotmd,  the  general  objectives will  therefore  be  realistic to 
the  extent  that,  without  cluttering  up  the  analysis  with  only  seemingly  useful 
details,  they  throw  sufficient light  on  the  general  circumstances  that  constrain 
the activities of  the  various  parties  concerned. 
With  such  a  gloomy  outlook,  a  policy of voluntnry  co-operntion  1s  needed  to  put  the 
industry back  ou  a  sound  footing,  as  the  solution  to  its difficulties  cannot  come  from 
./. - 2  -
outside.  This  policy must  take effect at  several  levels  in order  to: 
go  beyond  the restructuring effort already  accomplished,  which  is 
obviously  inadequate; 
ensure  that  this action  1s  consistent with  a  Community  spirit,  so  that 
any  temptation to restructure at  the  expense  of  breaking up  the  common 
market  is  resisted; 
give further  stimulus  to  reconversion projects,  which  are 'vital features 
of  a  positive strategy  towards  a  better 'allocation  of  resources. 
2.  An  order of priority commensurate  with  requirements 
The  realistic and  positive approach  adopted  here  means  that,  in  comparison  to 
earlier documents,  the structure  and  content  of  these general objectives  must 
be modified  in  the  light of  the priorities  identified. 
The  intolerable structural  imbalance  must  be rectified  in  the near  future  ..• 
The  Community's  political  commitment  on  restructuring refers  to  the year  1985, 
by which  time  the steel industry must  be viable under normal  market  conditions. 
Between  1980  and  1985,  overall  steel  demand  is  likely to decline somewhat(1) ,the .slig:"1tl: 
higher activity in  the  various  sectors  being more  than offset by  a  reduction  in 
specific consumption  in  the Community,  while  the-positive balance of external 
trade will also  fluctuate. 
On  the supply  side,  the  companies  declared  projects  indicate  that  production 
capacities will  remain  more  or  less  constant,  as  the plant  closures  announced 
are offset by productivity gains. 
Tff on  the  relatively optimistic  assumption.of. a  GNP  annual  average  growth  of 
1,9  %. 
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~  1985  gurplus  finished product  capacity would  then  be  in  the  rP_.on  of  SO  million 
tonnes,  about  33%  of  installed capacity.  This  structural  imbalanLc  is all  the  more 
indefensible in that it first  made  its appearance  in  1975:  its continuation over 
such  a  long  period has  tied up  resources  in  a  dangerous  and  costly manner: 
at sectoral level,  because it has  an  adverse  effect  on  the  conditions 
under  which  the steel  industry  op~rates,  thus  impairing  competitiveness; 
at  general  level,  because  it hampers  more  or  less  directly adjustments  in 
other  industrial sectors,  in particular by  deprivi11g  them  of  the  capital 
they need. 
That  is why  this  analysis  and  these proposals  for  action  give  priority  to  the 
correction of  the structural  imbalance. 
1n  the  face  of  international  competition  that will  become  fiercer 
throughout  the  decade  ... 
After  1985  forecasting  becomes  less precise,  but  1s  no  less essential. 
The  lack of  long-term references  demonstrates  the difficulty of  economic 
forecasting;  but  in tltis  context,  the  best  qualified  observers  nevertheless 
consider it reasonable  to  project  the  underlying  trends  evident  today  for  the 
period  up  to  1990. 
Although  this  estimation  cannot  ·  t  h  ·  go  1n  o  t  e  same  degree  of  forecasting  detail  as  for 
1985,  it nevertheless  indicates  for  1990  a  low  growth  in  steel  demand  and  an 
increase  in  the  pressure  of  competition  throughout  the  world  :  the  ruling  prices  in 
the  European  market  will  tend  in~vitably to  reflect  the  decline  in  world  prices, 
which  in  term  will  be  based  on  the  costs  of  the  most  efficient  wort~  producers~ 
The  standing  and  growth  of  each  ~teel  industry  will  therefore  depend  even  more  on 
its  competitiveness~ 
In  seeking  a  structural  balance  between  supply  and  demand,  therefore,  care  must  be 
taken  to  improve  the  competitiveness  of  all  the  factors  involved. 
An  analysis  of  the  key  factors  at  operational  and  strategic  level  can  identify  the 
elements  which,  once  the  surplus  supply  is mopped  up,  will  determine  the  competitive 
position of  the  steel  industry  for  the  rest  of  the  decadeA - 4  -
There  are many  such features  and  they  can  be  combined  into  three  categories: 
access  to markets; 
management  of  resources; 
socio-economic  environment. 
It is essential  to  step  up  action  a~ all  three  levels,  as  the  Community 
industry is not  at  the  moment  managing  to attain a  predominant:  position  1n 
any  one  of  them. 
the  strategic  importance  of  Community  cohes~on is  bound  to  increase. 
Levels of competitiveness  are  not  of  course  determined  solely by  the mechanics 
of free  competition,  since  several  factors  of  a  commercial  and  even political 
nature  come  into play.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  this will  probably. still be 
true  for  the  steel  industry  in  the  1980s~ 
·As .its other great  rivals  close  ranks  and  new  producers  take  the  offensive~ 
Community  cohesion  based  on  internal  market  becomes  of  even  greater  strategic 
importance  and  political  significance~ 
The  size of  the  internal market  remains  a  vital  cou~arative advantage,  while 
· the trade negotiations  and  industrial  strategies required  to  restimulate  the 
economy  call  for  a  minim~1 critical mass  well  beyond  the  reach  of  any  individual 
Member  S.tate. 
What  is more,  the  high  degree  of  interdependence of  the  national  steel 
industries  and  user  sectors  ~n  the  Community  is conducive  to  the  spread  of 
inefficien~y as  much  as  the  benefits of  reorganization. 
Consequently  these  general  objectives  deal  with the  Community  as  a  whole  and 
'-
contain no  details  for  individual  Member  States. 
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This  is to  avoid  drawing  attention  to  questions  which,  without  denying  their 
importance  or  sensitivity,  are  of  minor  status  compared  tu  che  crucial 
problem  of  the  structural  crisis  in  the  common  market~  Until  that  is 
rectified,  all  producers  and  users  w  i l l  suffer  because  the  distorting  factors 
have  a  snowball  effect,  jeopardizing  the  ability to  devise  efficient  recovery 
s t rat  eg i e s  ~ 
3~  A wider  political  framework 
In  view  of  the  scope  of  the  challenge  to  be  mr.~  and  tf c  vital  role that 
Community  cohesion  can  play  in  streamlining  the  indr•stry,  it might  be  useful 
to  recall  the  foundations  of  the  Communi  y  policy~ 
The  institutional  basis  for  the  steel  policy  is of  course  the  ECSC  Treaty, 
the  basic  approach  of  which  is surprisingly  up  to date  considering  that 
it was  designed  with  a  view  to  the  growth  of  the  industry~  The  Treaty  provides 
that  the  Commission  should  also  react  in  times  of  crisis or  impending  crisis. 
Fundamentally  the  Treaty  advocates  the  most  rational  dist~ibution of  production  at 
the  highest  possible  Level  of  productivity  1  and  forbids  unilateral  subsidies 
being  granted  by  member  states: this  might  usefully  be  borne  in  mind  at  a 
time  when  the  industry's difficulties are  giving  rise  to over-protective 
and  hidebound  attitudes. 
Nor  are  these  attitudes justified under  the  EEC  Treaty,  on  the  basis of  which 
the  Commission  aims  to  implement  a  Community  industrial  strategy  (1)  for 
adjustment  to  the  new  econom4c  conditions~ 
The  strengthening  of  the  Links  between  the  steel  policy  and  other  industrial 
policies  is  necessary  for  two  reasons  : 
to  ensure  that  Community  action  in  economic  matters  remains  consistent; 
to  open  up  a  wider  range  of  action  for  the  revival  of  the  steel  industry. 
(1)  COM(81)  639  final/2  of  29  October  1981~ - 6-
4 .. -The;·structural:nature of  the  crisis 
Although  the  recession  coming  on  top  of  structural  decline  has  caused  difficultie~ 
for  all  steel  produ~ers in  the  industrialized  countries,  the  Community  industry 
as  a  whole  has  reacted  less effectively  t~~n its rivals  : 
the  Japanese  industry,  taken  by  surprise  by  the  1973-1974  crisis  i :-,  the 
middle  of  a  major  expansion  programme,  unhesitatingly  embarked  on a 
cost-cutting  and  technical  improvemerit  campaigA  which  allowed  it to expand 
its markets  as  a  result  of  increased  competitiveness ... Nevertheless  at 
the  present  time  the  Japanese  gover~meht  ha~ declared  its  industry to  be  in 
a  state of  crises; 
the  American  industry,  less  advanced  technologically  but  with  sound 
financial  backing,  started to  shut  down  plant  in-order  to  keep  capacity 
in  line  with  demand~ but  without  automatical.Ly  seeki~g to  improve 
productivity at  th.e  moment;  however  its  capa.cityuti_~isation has  fallen  to 
40%  no~~V. 
The  Community  steel  industry,  which  was  older,  Less  well-located  and  more 
scattered  than  in  Japan,  was  unable  to  adapt  fast  enough  to  trends  in  demand 
in both  quantitative  and  qualitative  terms..  Stagnating  steel  output  in  the 
Community,  combined  with  slack  internal  consumption  and  an.  industry  not 
competitive  enough  to  increase  export~ would  not  in  themselves  have  brought 
about  the  structural  imbalance  if at  the  same  time  production  capacity  had  not 
increased substantially  since  1974,  as  a  result  either of  specific decisions 
on  capacity  or  advances  in  technical  productivity  .. 
The  structural  rigidities  in  the  member  ~countries aggravated  the_ impact  of  ---· 
.sur-plus  capacity  ..  Their.slowness  to  adapt  led to  a  competitive  Lag  that 
burdened profitability and  caused  f~nancial difficulties  .. 
The  worsening  structural  imbalance  was  accompanied  by  an  uncontrolled 
~scalation of  government  aid  and  triggered off  amongst  other  repercussions 
a  pr.ice  war ..  This  has  severely  reduced  the  revenue  of all  producers,  even  the 
most  competitive,  thereby  jeopardiiing  the general prospects  for  the 
streamlining  of  the ·ir1du~try'..  .-· 
Seeing  that  the  major  part  of  the  industry  was  incapable  of  adjusting  on  its 
own  initiative to  the  new  market  conditions  without  jeopardizing  all  that  had 
been  achieved  by  the  Community,  the  Commission  had  no  hesitation  in  stepping  up 
its direct  intervention  as  soon  as  the  condj~ions  laid down  in  the  Treaty 
were  met  :  it  had  no  choice  in  the  matter  .. 
This  determinated policy  constantly  bore  in  mind  the  need  to  preserve  a 
Community  sense  of  common  purpose  in the'effort  to  ~ake the  steel  industry 
competitive  again  in  the  long  run  .. 
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5.  Measures  to  organ~ze the market:  an  essential  transitional  st~·:~ 
give  the  industry  the  resources  it needs  for  restructuring 
At  the  end  of  1980  the  system  of  production  and  delivery quotas  0~1  the 
internal market  was  added  to  the  surveillance of  voluntary  restraint 
agreements,  price guidelines,  verifica~ion of  the  application of price-lists 
(extended  to  dealers'  price-lists  in  1981)  and  various  measur•s  concerning 
imports  from  non-member  countries,  which  rang'e  from  the  monitoring  of 
imports,  through  the  publication of  basic prices,  tc  che  conclusion of bilateral 
arrangements. 
a)  Good  results  but  potential  risks 
These measures,  taken  to  give  the  industry  the  time  and  resources  it 
needed  for  restructuring while  preserving. the  unity  of  the  internal 
market,  provided  relative financial  security even  for  the  least 
efficient  firms  by  pushing  up  sales  prices  substantially. 
The  price levels  achieved  in  the  first half of  1982  allowed  the  average 
firm  to  recover  .. on  average  all  its produCtions  costs,  whereas  earlier 
only  marginal  costs  ha~ been  co_vered-
Although  on  the  whole  the  cr~s~s  mea~ures may  be  regarded  as  successfu~ 
and  though  the  respect  of  t~e price  rules  of  the  Treaty  must  be  strictly 
controlled,  the  enj  must  not  be  confused  with  the  means-
Anticipation of  more  balance·d 'market  conditions  as  a  result of  a  voluntary 
policy  has  imposed  special  contraints  on  the  most  competitive  producers  and  on 
steel-using  firms,  i-e- on  the  two  categories  that  are  essential  to  the 
prosperity of  the  industry,  b~cause  : 
i)  when  dem~nd is sluggish,  the  average  competitiveness  of  the 
industry  can  pick  up  if the  market  shares  of  the  most  competitive 
producers  are  increased; 
ii)strict control of  production  and  artificially high  pr~ces may  cause 
a  later contraction  in  demand: 
- by  adding  to  the difficulties of  the user  sectors, 
- by  aggravating  product  substitution effects, 
- by  increasing pressure  from  imports. 
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That  is why  the  production  quota  scheme  must  not  become  institutionalized 
or  fom  the  sole  basis  of  a  structural  policy,nor  is it  conceivable  to 
continue treating the  adjustment  of  capacities  over  a  long  period  as 
a  purely cyclical matter;  not  only would  this  run  counter  to  economic 
logic but it would  also  be  contrary  to  the  requirements  of  the  ECSC  treaty. 
Nevertheless,  because  the  structural  impact  of  the  restrictions 
increases  the  longer  they  last,  the  only'way  of  preventing  this  from 
acting as  a  brake  to  adjustment  is to  introduce  into  this  compulsory 
system dynamic  factors  that will  encourage  restructuring. 
b)  The  criteria for  progressive  development  of  the  Community  anti-crisis measures 
Because it is  temporarily  taking  over  from  the mechanisms  of  the  free  market, 
Community  supervision  must  increasingly  take  its operating criteria  from  them: 
i)  the key  for  production  sharing  cannot  ignore  the  requirements  of 
economic  efficiency.  Elements  of  elasticity should  be  introduced  to: 
- integrate  the  structural  changes  of  markets,  in  particular  by 
taking more  recent  reference  periods  for  calculation of  the 
abatement  rates; 
- compensate  for  the specific disadvantages  that  the  quota  system 
may  have  for  certain producers,  and  in particular  those  manufacturing 
a  single product  as  they  are  unable  to  set off  losses  in one  product 
against benefits  1n  another; 
- take  account  of  restructuring by  allowing  companies  to adapt  quotas 
in the light of  their efforts  and  results at the  same  time  ensuring 
that this  does  not  o~cur at the  expense  of  the  most  efficient firms. 
ii)  the restriction of  production  cannot  reverse  the underlying 
trend of  prices  •·  which  in  this  industry are  1 inked  to  cost  movements. 
Over  the  period  1974-81,  prices  in real  terms  moved  downwards  by  2.2% 
a  year;  in  the period 1982/1985-86,  there will  most  probably  be  a 
downward  trend of  around  2%  a  year  in  real  terms,  due  to  the  fall  1n 
unit  costs. 
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Taken  as  a  \.,rhole,  mr:asures  to  organize  and  regulate  the  internal  market 
sh6uld  fnciliLate  the  restructuring effort within  the  company,  financed 
by  its  own  resources. 
This  effort deserves  to be  supported  in preference  to  stepping  up  government aid  which, 
a~art  from  the  possibl~ effect  of distorting  competition,  was  not,  before  the  aid  cede 
was  applied;  always  based  on  strictly economic  and  community  criteria~ 
6.  Requirements  and  criteria for  the  restructuring policy 
To  ensure  that  government  aid  to  the  steel  industry  provides  support  for  the 
necessary  restructuring effort,  the  Community  has  established  specific rules  on 
aid  to  the  steel  industry,  alongside  the  introduction of  compulsory  market-
discipline.  These  rules  also allow  the  actions  of  the  member  states  1n  this 
field  to  be  coordinated at  Community  level. 
Aid,  which  must  be  degressive,  is  allowed  only  up  to  1985,  and  must  be  1n 
conjunction with  restructuring  programmes  that  are consistent with  the 
objectives  of profitability and  reducing  capacity. 
Like  production quotas,  government  aid,  which  must  also  be  oriented  towards 
structural  streamlining,  wil1  therefore  have  to  create  tl1e  conditions  under 
which  it becomes  no  longer  necessary. 
a)  ·criteria for  the  evaluaticin  of  restructuring plans 
Obviously  the greatest  effort.must  be  made  by  companies  which: 
- use  the  most  obsolete  and  anti-economic  plants; 
- record  the  highest  losses; 
- benefit  from  the  highest  subsitlies; 
-have precarious  markets,  as  a  result  of  the  type  of  product  they  malie  c, 1 ~ 
dependence  on  exports  to  third markets  .. 
The  criteria for  evaluating  the validity of  restructuring  plans  stem 
from  the  overall  analysis  made  in  these general  objectives: 
i)  Excess  production  capacity  has  an  impact  on  the  overall  viability 
of  the  Comiiltmity  industry  more  harmful  than  any  other  factor. 
By  cutting back  capacity,  it should  be  possible  to  offset  foreseeable 
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capacity surpluses  for  1985,  which are  of  the  order  of 33%  for 'fi.ni shed 
oroducts,  ranging  from  23%  for  cold  roll~d sheet  to  more  th~n 44%  for 
hot  rolleq  sheet; 
ii)  After  the  upward  adjustment  in  the  first  half  of  1982,  it  is estimated  that 
prices will  continue  their downward  trend  in real  terms.  Any  scheme  to 
restore profitability that does  not  count  on  an  annual  average  fall of 
at least  2%  in  real  selli~g prices  w  the  Community  up  to  1985  ~s 
unrealistic; 
iii)  As  far  as  costs  are  concerned,  the  downward  trend brought  about  by 
technical  progress  will  be  reinforced  by  the  impact  of  the  enormous 
reserves  of  productivity  evident  from  the  gap  opened  up  by  the 
Japanese and,  in  some  cases,  the  most  efficient Community  producers. 
In  this  respect,  the  existence  of  "normative  costs"  (1)  allows  evaluation 
of  the cost  improvement  hypotheses  put  forward  in  company  plans.  Taking 
an  average  for  the  Community,  it is possible  to predict  that  costs will 
fall annually  by  around  2%,  but it is nevertheless  obvious  that  in 
respect  of  costs,  even  more  than  for  capacity  reduction  and  prices, 
the  analysis·and  the criteria have  to  be  adapted  to  the  structure 
of  each  individual  company. 
b)  Contradictions  to  be  avoided  if  the overall  effort  is  to  succeed 
As  a  result of  experience  gained  in  tl:Je  f,irst  phase  of  examining  company 
plans  in  the  light  of  these  fundamental  criteria,  several  contradictions 
that might well  jeopardize  the  success  of  the overall restructuring effort 
can already be detected. 
Too  many  companies  are  aiming  first and  foremost  to  improve  profitability by 
increasing  the  use  of  existing  plant,  ruther  than  dealing  with  the  problems  caused 
by  Least  efficient  plant~  With  this approach,their  main  objective  is to  increase 
sales  and  take  a  bigger  share  of  the  market, which  involves  several  contradictions: 
- companies  are  counting  on  their partners to  reduce  capacity  while  refusing 
to  d6  id  themselves; 
- the  ~tannid production  increased  woul~ not  be  possible  under  the  quota  scheme 
and  yet  they still wish  this  scheme  to  continue; 
(1)  "Normative  costs"  are  the  theoretical  costs of  each  company  on  the  basis of 
the  optimum  use  of  its plant  and  the  ~rices of  the  production  factors  at· 
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- at  a  time  of  sluggish or  even  declining  demand,  the  relation  between 
selling prices  and  sales  volumes  is crucial:  savinp,s  )n  terms  of  unit 
costs  Jrom  incrL•<.Js~u  production may  often  be  more  than  cancelled  out 
by  the  resultant  reduction  in  selling prices. 
The  companies'  individual  restructuring  plans  drawn  up  under  such 
conditions  are  irreconcilable both with  each other  and  ~ith the 
objective  for  the·Community  as  a  wholo. 
Taken  individually,  tlwse  plans  show  that  the  individual  company's 
profitability will  be  restored  by  1985.  However,  when  the  capacities 
adopted  in  each  plan  are  added  together,  they  show  a  continuing overall 
imbalance  on  the  market,  the  adverse  effect of  which  on  prices  -
could  not  be  neutralized  indefinitely,  and  th~refore the  assumption  that 
the  industry  woulrl  become  profitable  again  proves  to  bP.  illusory~ 
With  the  same  historical  downward  trend,  the  level  of prices  1s  affected  by 
capacity levels:  they will  be  sufficient  to  cover  total  ~osts,  maintaining 
the  1982  improvement,  if surplus  capacity  is  abolished,  but  they will  only 
cover  marginal  costs  if  the  surplus  remains. 
To  avoid  this  risk,  efforts must  be  stepped  up  in  two  directions: 
i)  Companies  must  no  longer  regard' prices  as  a  purely  exogenous 
factor  since  they,  far  more  than  the  Commission,  are  in  a  position 
to  control  prices  through  their  capacity decisions.  The 
closing  down  of  plant must  meet  their  own  needs  not  only  1n  prospect 
of  cost  reduction  but  also  111  respect  of  price  increases.  Going  beyond 
the  micro-economic  viewpoint,  restoration of  balance  in  the  sector 
calls  for  a  clef ini  te  commitment  on  the  part of  the  companies. 
ii) Strict vigilance  by  the  Commission  becomes  crucial  in this respect, 
since  the  link  between  capacity  reduction  and  stable  price  levels  will  only 
come  about  if  company  plans  are  reviewed  within  the  overall  framework . 
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c)  An  effort  from  which  no-one  ~s  a~!omatically excluded 
The need  for  renewed  efforts,  even  greater  than  called  for  by  the earlier 
forecasts,  means  that no-one  can  be  automatically  ruled out,  provided 
that  government  aid  is  granted within  the  period  1980-85. 
i)  The  fact  that  restructuring was  carried out  before  1980,  although 
taken  into account  by  the  Commissiqn,  does  not  mean  that  there  is 
no  need  to maintain  the momentum  of this  effort.  The  mere  fact  that 
a  company  has  recourse  to  government  aid  shows  that it still needs 
to  adapt  to market  trends  after  1980  and  that  it should  contribute to 
redressing  the  imbalance  of  the  world  market; 
ii)  It is not  possible  to  exclude  financial  restructuring  from  the 
effort  to  reduce  capacity  and  include only  industrial restructuring 
proper.  A sound  investment  policy must  at  least succeed  in  getting 
back the  cost of  the  capital  used,  whatever  its origin. 
Consequently  financial  problems  are  almost  always  the  outcome  of  poor 
industrial decisions,  and  therefore  responsibility  must  be  accepted  by  those 
concern.ed; 
iii)  Since  the  p~iority aim  is  to  progress  towards  a  balanced market, 
reductions  in rolled  finished  products  are  essential  and  closures 
further  up  the  line are  no  substitute.  Rather  such  closures  should 
be additional  since it is at  the  ~ron and  steel making  stage  that  the 
impact  on  costs is  gre~test. 
iv)  Social  and  regional  considerations  are crucial:  to  delay  restructuring 
wiLl  not  resolve  the  problem  of  emptoiment  and  risks  di scourag:lng 
reqional  development.~ -·I·t.is.necessary therefore  to  plan  specific 
inttiatives  in  the  field  of  reconversion~ 
.  The  excess capacity  to· be  eliminated  is  so  great  that  even  unsubsidized 
'-
. ·producers ,cannot be  exempted. from  making  a  contribution,  even  if only 
because  they  berrefit  from improved  p.rice  levels  resulting  from  the  crisis 
measures  ..  , : , 
· Al-though•  :d~-e -Gomm:ission 's r-ole  is  less  compelling  m  the  case of 
s•ubsi-dize~L~ot~panies,. it is never.theless  f<:lr  from  negligible.  Specific 
.i!Jlpetus  will  come  from: 
- dyn.inii<!  use  or·prolfucticm' quota!; 
...  c~ffimi~sion'f's  opinions  on'  investn;ent ;' 
- restructuting and  reconversion loans. 
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7.  A  revival  strat~gy 1n  place  of  a  defensive  policy 
The  Con@unity  a1rn  1s  to  stimulate  the  concentration  and  consolidation of 
resources  at  the  strong points.  Far  from  being· a  manoeuvre  to  dismantle 
the  industry,  it is  the  only revival  strategy possible  under  existing  and 
foreseeable  circumstances.  These  circumstances  forbid  the  institutionalization 
of  a  defensive  policy  that 
- would  swallow  up  extensive  resources  at  Con@unity  level; 
- would  increase  the  temptation  to  take  national measures  incompatible with 
the  common  market; 
-would  encourage  a  wait-and-sec attitude  and  reduce  the  industry's  incentive 
to  adapt; 
would  make  wasteful  and  unrewardittg  usc  of  human,  technical  and  financial 
resources  that  are  'competitive  with  those  of  the  Community's  most  dangerous 
competitors~ 
Whether  the  aim  1s  to  meet  internal  demand  under  optimum quality  and  price 
conditions,  or  to  safeguard  jobs  or  revitalize regions  affected  by  the crisis, 
a  policy of  supporting  sectoral  inefficiency can  never  be  successful  in  the  long 
run. 
a)  Action  on  key  factors 
What  must  be  done  therefore  is  to  revc~rse  the  tenoency  towards  nw.nagi np;  the 
rundown  of  the  industry  so  as  to  tackle efficiently  the  full  range  of 
key  factors  determining  the  competitiveness  of  the  Community  steel  industry 
1n  the  1980s: 
i)  Demand  must  be  sustained  by  a  suitable  combination of quality  and 
prices  and  by  aggressive  marketing  b~sed on  fast  and  reliable 
deliveries,  before  and  after-sales  serv~ces and  advice  for  customers, 
increased  cooperation with  consumers,  and  a  closer association of 
steel  export  policy with  the  flows  of  world  trade; 
ii)  Production  management  offet·s  extensive  scope  for  improvement  which 
must  be  used  so  that  factor  yil•1d  can  offset  the  increase  in  factor 
prices.  Host  of  the  Japanese  advantage  (which  can  provide  a  yctrdstick 
for  the  effort  to  he  put  in)  is not  clue  to  factor  prices but  to 
proJuctivity.  The  mean  diffcrcnee  to  be  made  up  on  Japanese  producers 
in  terms  of  cost  per  tonne 
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of  steel was  at least  15-20%  in 1981. 
These  are  the  lines  to  be  followed  in strengthening  the  investment 
effort,  seeking  internal  and  external  rationalization  and  making 
company  management  more  efficient.  Rationalization of  iron production, 
wider  introduction of ·co·ntinuous  casting and  improvement  of rolling 
mill  productivity  should  be  strictly coordinated  so  as  to  bring  down  the' 
break-even  point  and  increase  Lhe  ecoriomic  yield of"the  factors  employed~ 
iii)  The  availability and  cost  of  the  ~inancial resources  to  hack  up  this 
effort will  be  of vital  importance.  Self-financing  should  be  strengthened 
because  supply  conditions outside  the  company  '~ill  for  the  most  part 
be  governed  by  the  general  conditions  on  the market  which  seem  likely to 
remain  fairly difficult. 
b)  Increasing the  impact  of  Community  policies 
The  Community  can  play  an  important direct  and  indirect  role  1n  improving 
the  factors  making  for  competitivity in  the  steel  industry: 
i)  Support  for  reconversion Hill  be  stepped  up.  After  the  introduction 
in  the  "non-quota"  section  fo  the  EEC  Regional  Development  Fund  of  a 
specific  Cornn1unity  project  to  help  remove  obstacles  to  the  development 
of  new  activities  in  some  steelmaking  areas,  the  Commission  is, 
amongst  other measures,  to  propose  new  projects  in  a  second  set  of 
non-quota  regional  fund  operation~. 
The  aspects  of most  in~ediate  ~ocial  relevance  (going  further  than  the 
recently extended  r~conversions loans  and  retraining grants)  will 
later be  strengthened  so  as  to  become  a  specific  component  of  the 
reconversion policy; 
ii)  The  steel  research activities will  be  given  a  fresh  impetus  so  as  to 
provide  a  better link between  the  design  phase  and  industrial application 
and  to  improve  coordination with  research  wor~ in other  sectors; 
iii) The  ECSC  financing  policy will  be  rigorously pursued  and  will  be  an 
important  factor  in channelling  investment,  diversifying  supplies  and 
giving access  to  international capital markets  on  optimum  terms  or even 
at  subsidized  rates. 
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Since  n·quircments  an~  so  vast,  it will  he  !H'C<'!;~;;1ry  to  devise 
ancl  introJuce  necessary  adjustments  designed  to  strc '"'then  the 
att  ... Llctivne ss  of  Community  financing. 
iv)  The  external  commercial  policy  should  bring  about  better integration 
of  the  promotion  of  steel  exports~ 
However,  the  ovcr<Jll  prospects  of  the, steel  sector  dc·)L•nd  above  all  on  the 
success  of  a  Community  industrial  strategy  and  a  determined  policy of 
stimulating  investment.  The  Commission's  tt~nking on  these  matters  is 
known,  several  practical  proposals  have  <1l1.·eady  beeil  submitted  and  others 
are  1n preparation;  it is  therefore  vi1. l  to  bear  in  mind  that  sectoral 
activities must  be  consislent with  th  .. e  general  objectives. 
Cor;1clusion 
Community  action  can  take  many  different  <md  far-reaching  forms,  affecting  not 
only  companies  but  also  their  socio-economic  environment.  The  instruments 
must  be  managed  consistently  and  must  be  regarded  as  together  forming  a 
necessary mechanism  for  tackli11g  all  aspects  of  the  steel  industry's  problems. 
A  spoke  in  one  of its wheels,  even  if apparently  justified by  a  particular  case, 
may  reduce  the  cohesion  of  the  syslem  and  thereby  cancel  out  the  effects  of 
other measures  whose  individual  efficiency depends  on  their being  integrated 
-
with all  the  other elements.  However,  ·even  though  the  Community  offers  a 
dynmnic  framework  to  ensure  that  nationa]  policies  and  company  stratq~iC's  <Ire 
consistent, the  recovery  of  the  industry  steel  depends  first  and  foremost  on  the 
degree  of  commitment  shown  by  t11e  companies  themselves  and  on  their determination 
to  initiate measures  that  wiil  help  to  streamline it. 
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II.  ECONOMIC  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE:  A SOMBRE  OUTLOOK 
1.  A difficult  macro-econom~c background 
At  world  level,  rRdical  changes  have  upset  the  traditional monetary,  industrial 
and  trade  balances  over  the  past  ten years  and  have  reduced  general  economic 
growth  every\vhere.  The  consolidated  indicator of  inr-.ct·national  trade  ~ives 
I 
a  quantitative  idea of  this malaise  by  way  of  a  reduction  in the  volume  of  the 
annual  growth of world  trade,  which  dropped  from  8.5%  from  1960  to  1973  to 
4.5%  from  1973  to  1979,  but  does  not  show  how  much  keener  international competition 
is becoming  as efforts are made  to  shore  up  increasingly difficult  internal 
growth.  Looking  ahead,  it seems  likely  that all  these  factors will  continue  up 
to  1985,  when  the most  optimistic estimates predict  an  average  growth  ~n 
extra-Comnunity world  trade  of  5%  a  year. 
The  draft fifth medium-term  economic  policy plan  for  the  Comnunity  has  painted  an 
economic  picture  based  on  low  and  variable  growth  rates,  and  has  emphasized 
the  importance  of  the  effort  to  restore  a  satisfactory development  mechanism. 
In  the  Community,  the  growth  in  the  gross  domestic  product,  5%  before  19?_~  __ has 
fallen  to  2.5%  since  the  first  oil  crisis. 
Slower  growth,  falling profits,  pessimi~m and  uncertainty about  econom~c 
prospects have  resulted  in a  great  decline  in  the  development  of  investment. 
Since  1973,  investment  has  increased  at  less  than  1%  a  year  whereas  an  annual 
growth rate of  over  5%  had  been  recorded  over  the  ten previous  years.  Although 
investment  is directed mainly  to~ards modernization  and  rationalization, 
pro~rcss in  the  adjustment  of  industrial  production  structures has  been  i11adequate, 
either because  too  little capital  has  been  invested  or  because  there  has 
been no  genuine  redevelopment  strategy. 
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This  development  is unsatisfactory in  compar1son  with  the  level~ recorded 
by  some  of  our  r-ivnl~;.  Analy~H'l;;  cunductcd  by  t:IH'  Cnnunis~;i(>Jl  ,w  t·he 
competitiveness  of  Conmunity  industry reveal  signs  of  relative  weakness 
compared  to its international  competitors,  and  these  arc  all  t1'c  more 
dangerous  in  that  they  extend  over  numerous  sectors,  including  some  high-
growth  sectors,  and  affect  several  key  factors  ranging  from  productivity 
to  the  creation  of  the  surplus  and  its accumulation. 
Foreseeable  trends  up  to  1985,  if current  tendenci0s  continue,  are  unlikely 
to differ much  overall  from  those  recorded  from  ~~73  to  ~980.  With  some 
progress being made  1n  the battle against  inf~ 1tion,  b1dget deficits  and 
rising unemployment  may  well  prove  major  h:  !_tcaps  to  the  picking  up  of· 
internal  growth.  Internationally,  against  ;  financial  background  marked'by 
tension over  exchange  rates  and  the  concentration  of  indebtedness,  the  oil 
price  trends  may  seriously  reduce  demand  from  OPEC  countries,  while  demand 
in industrialized countries  might  suffer  from  a  resurgence  of  protectionism. 
Under  these  circumstances,  with  an  upturn  J.n  1983,  !.:.!_~grmvth  of  the  GDP  J.n 
the  Community  could  ave_~age  up  to  1,9%  over  the  period  1981/1985. 
Investment  could  also  pick  up  slightly  although  \·lithout  exceeding  the  GDP 
gro\vth  rates.  However,  there  \vill  be  little incre:1se  in  employment,  \vhilc 
the deficit on  the  balance  of  payments  could  tend  to  improve. 
Consequently  the  world  and  Community  background  gives  little reason  for 
ex~essive optimism:  it 1s  1n  a  context  of  slackened  growth  that  sectoral 
adjustments  become  both  more  difficult  and  more  important.  These  sectoral 
adjustments  must  also  be  carrictl. out  consistC11Lly  in  orJcr  to  prevent  them 
from  hindering  each  other  and  to  provide  maximum  sti.mulus  for  synergies, 
since  both  are  equally possible  in  complex  processing  economies. 
2.  Slower  development  1n  steel-using  sectors 
In  a  micro-economic  approach,  the  consumption  of  intermediate  goods  such 
as  steel  products  is  a  demand  governed  by  the  level  of  activity of  the 
user  sectors. 
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Aftc1:  dec] ining  sh;trply  in  197'j,  the  ovcn1ll  indux  of  activity iu  the  tilecl_-
using sectors picked  up  somewhat  in  1976  to  a  level that  remained  fairly 
steady up  to  1981  (see Table  1). 
INDEX  CF  ACTIVIT~*lN USER  SECTORS  CLASSifiED  BY  NAC~  TA9LE 
Production  index  197S  = 1~0  -
~~RS 
~ SECTORS..  -
1970  1971  1972  197J  1974  1975  1976  1977  19-78  1979  19ao  1981 
-
22  Preliminary  processing  - ·-
l 
101,3  107,5  118,7  122,5 1 
Manufacture  of  steel  tubes  - - - - -
32  Meehan i cal  engineering  - 95,8  94,5  100,4  105,5 
34  Electrical  engineering  83,1  86,0  92,4  102,0  106,4 
35  Means  of  transport  - 100,2  104,1  111,9  103,3 
Shipyards  89, 5  911,1  104,)  100,6  87,1 
31  Manufacture  of  metal  articles  - 103,2  101 ,S  108,0  110,8 
50  Building and  civil engineering 
(excluding  Italy,  10 7, 4  107, 6  112,3  112, 1  101 ,a 
the  NetherLands  and  Denmark) 
Other  users  102,8  99,4  102,6  107,6  107,4 
TOTAL 
( i)  - 101,2  104,5  112,0  112,9 
(*)  Indices  of  value  added  at  factor  cost,  at  constant  prices,  except: 
- tube  manufacture:  production  indices 
- shipyards  :  compensated  gross  registered  tonnage  indices. 
- ~tner  uiers~  produ~tion indices  weighted  by  consumption  in  1977 
(l>  Weighir.q  :  real  steel  consumption  in  19/a 
100  108,9  106,6  110,7  11o,o  1 10,5  108,5 
100  100,5  93,5  103,7  104,7  103,6  1 14,7 
100  100,S  100,9  1C0,9  103,7  105,3  1C2,5 
100  106,5  111,5  111.,6  116,5  120,7  117,4 
100  113,7  119 ,a  122,1  127,0  1  19; 1  113,4 
100  112,0  '15, 3  76,9  64,9  53,0  -
100  105,3  106,4  104,3  10a, 7  108,8  103,4 
100  99,9  99,6  102,5  103,4  102,5  95,6 
100  104,3  104,9  115,1  - - -
100  106,/:l  1 06,&  1C8,9  113,1  1C9,6  105,6 
Since  1976,  the  production  trend  for  all  user  sectors has  been  weaker  than 
those  for  industrial  production  and  the  gross  national  product;  this movement 
is  ~oth compatible  with,  and  complementary  to,  the  decline  in the  relative 
share of  investment  in  the  GDP  (see  Table  2). 
TREND  111  APPARENT C0'4SUr·1PTION  OF  FINIS~EO  STEEL  PRODUCTS  AND  9RANCfl  ACT!'JIT!ES  IN  T"E  c~~~~··ITY 
Indices:  1975  =  1~0 
Index  of  Apparent  steel  con- l<1dex 
activity  in  steel  sumpt1on  of  industrial 
us i nQ  sectors  (,) finishea  proaucts  procc.ction 
1971  101,2  103  *  94,9 
1972  104,5  109  •  99,1 
1973  112,0  120  *  106,5 
1974  112,9  120,0  107,1 
1975  100  100  100 
1976  106,8  113,1  107,4 
1977  106,8  107,3  109,9 
1978  108,9  106,lo  112,5 
1979  113,1  114,4  118,1 
1980  109,6  108,7  117,, 
19d1  w::. ,6  105  *  114,5 
1985  113,6  106,0 
(1)  lndex  we1ghted  by  r~al  st~el  con~umpt1on 1n  the  dlftereryt  s~c~Jrs  1n  19.78  · 
*)  estimations 
bOP 
90,4 
94-,o 
99,5 
101,3 
100 
,05,1 
107,5 
110,9  ,,,6 
115,9 
115,3 
127,2 
TAFlLE  2 
./. 
1'185 
115 ,">c 
11<.,14 
'"·'j  123,1. 
123,oc 
69,7 
11C, 7 
1Ct.,1C 
118,13 
113,60 - 19  -
If  the  pressure of  internationttl  competition  continues,  it  sec:'  rc:1sonable 
to project  these  trends  up  to  1985,  taking  into  account  the  gc;  :ral  decline 
in activity recorded  in  1980  and  assuming  a  modest  upturn  in 1982-83,  more 
for  technical  reasons  than because  of  a  structural  inversion  j  :·,  the  cycle, 
which will probably not  take  place until  the  more  distant future. 
In  shipbuilding,  the  level  of  activity can  be  expected  to  '·ema1n  fairly  poor, 
below  the  1970  level,  although  in relative
1 terms  it will  j)~ck  up  on  1980, 
while all other  sectors will  exceed  the  1975  leve'.  The  best results  are 
likely to  be  recorded  by vehicle  construction,  ~bout a  qt arter  up  on  1975, 
followed  by electrical  engineering  and  prelir· inary  processing.  Compared  to 
1980,  mechanical  engineering  and  the  manu[.  ..:ure  of  tubes  could  pick  up  somewhat, 
while  the  very  low  growth  1n  the  manufactu:  :  of  metal  articles  ~md building is 
unlikely  to  change. 
This  development  reflects  the still cyclical nature  of  the  movements  (transport 
equipment),  structural  adjustments  tending  to  concern  the  development  of 
services  and  continuing modernization  of  the  production  apparatus  (electrical 
engineering),  with are-equipment  component  in prospect  (preliminary processing 
and  mechanical  engineering). 
On  the  \vhole,  therefore,  the  foreseeable  outlook  for  the  activity of  the 
steel-using sectors  does  not  justify any  optimism;  indeed,  it calls  for 
additional  caution. 
The  figures  showing  the  changes  in  the  indices  are  so  small  that  the  margins 
of statistical error normally  expected  in this  type  of exercise  could 
change  the  scale or  even  the  sign of  the  variations. 
This  also affects  the  degree  of  reliability of  the  comparative  evaluations 
between different  sectors,  which  stem  from  general  statistical classifications 
that  are  increasingly  inadequate  in  the  light  of  changes  in actual  production  . 
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That  i·s  why  sectoral details,  together  wit~ macro-econonnc  j nformation,  can 
provide no  more  than general  guidance  for  economic  operators.  This  guidance 
cannot  be  sufficient  in itself but  must  be  combined  with  a  much  more 
accurate definition of  the  demand  prospects  by  category of product  (quality-
price)  in relation to  the  customer  and  the  relevant market,  which  can  be  done 
only at  company  level. 
3.  Declining product  consumption  1n  the  Corrununity 
To  pass  from  macro-economlc  trends  and  the activity of  user  sectors  to  the 
consumption of  steel products,  use  must  be  made  of  consumption  functions,  whose 
coefficients are  determined  by  several  factors. 
These coefficients depend  on  two  ma1n  components: 
- Structural  component:  growth  in  the  GDP  b~yond certain thresholds  is 
accompanied  by  a  reduction  in  the  weight  of  the  sectors with  the  greatest 
steel consumption,  especially building; 
Technical  component:  technological  progress  combined  with  the variation  1n 
relative prices determines  the variation  in  the  technical  production 
coefficients  1n  the  steel  industry  and  in  the  user  industries,  wltich  also 
use  products  that  are  alternatives  to  steel.  Several  factors  already  identified 
_·govern  the  reduction  in specific  steel  consumption;  for .example,  the value 
of most  products  at constant  prices  is  i1~reasing more  than Xheir weight, 
product~ having  a  high value  per unit  of weight  are  developing more  rapidly, 
·and modifications  in product  design  and  production  processes  arc  bringing 
about  a  reduction  1n  scrap  and  an  increase  in steel yield. 
Taken overall,  the  specific  steel  consumption  functions  therefore  tend  to 
decline  over  a  long  period:  total  steel  consumption  in  the  Community  in 1980 
was  less  than  in 1972,  despite  an  increase  in the  output  of. the user  sectors,  ,_ 
in industrial production  and  in the  GDP  (see  Table  2). 
By  1985,  this  tendency will  probably  be  confirmed,  because  of  its consolidated 
nature which  is virtually  indepcndant  of  any  cyclical  upswing,  thus  reducing 
still further  the outlets for  Connuunity  steel products. 
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The  combination  of  a  poor  econom1.c  situation  and  the  continuation of  the 
general  trend  towards  a  reduction  ~n specific  steel  consumption  makes  it 
_:~e c c s sa r'y  __  "S_~j_o re  c_9_?_~_c:_~n sumpt ion  of  finished  products  in  the  Community 
at± 92  million  tonnes  (see  tabl~ 3) 
TABLE  3 
REAL  CONSUMPTlON  OF  FINISHED  PRODUCTS  IN  THE  COMMUNITY,  BY  SECTOR 
('000 000  tonnes) 
Mean  annual  variation I 
Mean  annual  variation 
Forecast  between  1978  and  1985  betwE>en  1978  and  1985 
1978  1985  with  a  constant  CX)  specific  conslft'pt ion 
Preliminary  processing  3),8  22,2  0,89  O,f>2 
Manufacture  of  steel  tubes  14,1  15,5  1,31  1,37 
Mechanical  engineE>ring  7,1  7,5  0,35  1  ,31 
Electrical  engineering  2,5  2,3  -1,00  1,07 
Shipyards  1,5  0,9  -6,21  -1,38 
Vehicle  construction  10,7  9,7  -1,45  ·0,17 
Building  and  civil  engineering  9,2  8,4  -1,31  O,U 
Manufacture  of  metal  articles  j'·' 
19,5  -0,40  0,86 
Other  users  6,6  6,2  -a, n  0,37 
TOTAL  92,8  92,2  -0,09  0,72 
---'-· 
The  impact  of  the  reduction  ~n specific  consumption  is  far  from  negligible:  the 
average  annuol  variation  1n  total  consumptio_n  bet\veen  1978  and  1985  is  likely 
to  be  -0.09%  compored  to  +0~2%  which  would  be  attained  if  specific  consumption 
remained  constant. 
co 
The  trend  in  demand  will  then  be-negative  in most  sectors  (electrical  engineering, 
shipyards,  means  of  transport  a11d  building);  this will not  be  offset  by  the 
increased  c•nsumption  in preliminary processing  and  the  manufacture  of  tubes 
and  the  sustained  level  of mechanical  engineering  and  the manufacture  of metal 
articles. 
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On  the  two  main  conventional  product  groups,  flat  products  should  continue 
to  record greater  growth  than  bars  and  sections  (see  Table  4). 
CONSUMPHON  Of  FINISHED  PRODUCTS  IN  THE  COMMUNlr'Y,  BY  PRODUCT  CATEGORY  TABLE  4 
('000 000  "'  t ::rn 
!  l  M~a.n  annual  variation 
W74  1975  l976 : 1977  1978  1979  19ec·  '  1981•  1985  - :  ; 
~St7a  B'l/80  r-; l  ,:. ) ' 3  ~ • 
Lt~JI),·'-1  st  .. •et  ? ,0  1,3  :  1,7 i  1,6  1,6  1,6 i  1,4  - 1,59  2, 23  '  2,1  -
I 
I 
Ingots  and  s.em1 s  I 
1,3, 
I 
Tu!>e  ingots  ;  ;  :  I  2, 4  1,5  1,4  1,2  - 3,2  - 2, 21 
,Other  ingots  and  semis  ;  ;  :  1,1  8,8  9,8  8, 7 !  8,4  - ,,7  - o, eo  . 
!OTAL  11,!  10, s  10,2  10,1  lll, 3  11,2  10,,  9,6  - 1,o1  - 0,99 
Fini sh~d rolled  (;!roduct~  7,2  b,ll  6,8  6,1  1.,8  6,8  6,6  5,7  - 2,55  -, l, 1 z 
Merchant  bars  20,0  17 ,l  18,6  17,6  ,6,3  17,2  11 ,s I  15,3  - 0,91  - 2, 9~ 
8,3  9,9 
! 
9,6  10,1  10,9  10,2:  Wi rc  rod  10,7  I  10,2  •  0,12.  - 0,05 
Hot-rotte-d  strip  - --- 7;7  - :;-;.-·  -·6,  1  -.  6,1  6,1  6,4  5,4·:  4,6  - 3,86  - l,  1 s  i 
Plate>  3mm  )  )  t9,  1  17.1  16,4  17,9  17,5 :  11,1.  ..  0,79  - 0,18 
Sheet  <  3mm  l  44,9  l37' 5  18,5  18,3  17,8.  19,3  17,4  18,1  •  0,69  ..  1, 49 
)  7,0  6,9  7,2  8,1  8,0  9,4  +  3,8S  +  3, 1lt. 
I 
Coated  sheet  l 
TOTAl  ~.s  74  ,4  86,5  81,6  so.  7  86,7  83,C  81,2  t  0,09  - 0,42 
I  GRAND  TOTAL  1M,4  E7 ,0  98,4  9.;~  9 2, 6  99,5  9C.,6  91,,  92,2  - 0,06  - 0, .51 
Amongst  fl3t  products,  dcmnnd  is  likely  to  be  particularly  sustained  for  sheet 
{less  than  3  mm  thicl<)  and  co3ted  sheet;  over  the  period  1980-85,  annual  r;routh 
rates could  be  around  1,5  and  3,1%  respectively.  Consumption  of  heavy  plate 
should  remain at  the  1980  level,  while  ~trip could decline  by  3%. 
Amongst  bars  and  sections,  demand  is likdy to  fall  appreciably  for  heavy 
sections  (-3,17.)  and  merchant  bar.s  (-3,00,  while wire  rod  consumption  should 
remain stable,  confirming  the  levels  recorded  since  1979. 
•  n, ~ 
In  conclusion  it  should  be  stressed  that  whatever  criteria  of  average  capacity 
(-80%  or  -60  %)  is  used  and  whatever  view  (optimistic  or  pessimistic)  is taken, 
it  is nevertheless  a  fact  that  surplus  structural  capacity exists  which  1s  too 
Large  to affect  the. lack  of  competitivity  of  the  sector. 
4.  The  world  market  and  foreign  trade:  slower  development  rates 
Standardized  technology  and  products  make  the  steel  industry  a  "world" 
industry,  which  is  re~arded everywhere  as  a  necessary  basis  for  industri~l 
development. 
. I. - 23  -
The  world  steel market  is characterized  by  very keen  competition against 
a  background  of declining  demand  and  structural  imbalance. 
The  world  surplus  in production capacity  ~s  accompanied  Ly  marked  geographical 
differences  in  supply  and  demand  trends.  As  a  result  there  is an  enormous 
marginal  supply  that  aggravates  the  fluctuations  in  the  steel  cycle. 
On  the  demand  side,  the  movement  of  stocks  ~s  of vital  importance  because  of 
I 
the  increase  in both  its relative  significance  and  its variability.  Alongside 
speculative buying  encouraged  by  the  instability of  exchange  rates,  there  ~s 
the  impact  of  the  emergence  of  new  countries actively engaged  in trading 
and  the effects of protectionist manoeuvring. 
The  growth  in world  steel  demand  slackened  off  in  the  1970s:  ~n the  second  half 
of  the  decade  it recorded  an  annual  average  growth  rate of  about  2%  compared 
with  5%  earlier  (see  Table  5). 
TAi'LE  5 
WORLD  STEEL  PRODUCTION  AND  CONSU~?T!ON  ( '000  (l(•l)  tonnt•s) 
Pro  duet 10n  % annual  Apparent  consumption  /..  annu.Jl 
(crud<:  steel  equivalent)  averZ~ge  gro1.-0th  (crude  steel  equivalent)  averag€'  growtl•  .  ~:}q  +~:t . 
-
19W  1'/:C.~. 
1975  1975  1980  1985 
--·~·-- 1no  1985  19/)  1<,>r.u 
--~----- -----. -- ·--------'  -------------- ------ Western  Europe  29,1.  33,8  35,0  + 2, 8  +  0, 7  36,2  31.,5  35,0  - 1,0  +0,3  (excLuding  f(C) 
Eastern  Europe  192,7  209,2  220,0  +  1,7  +  1,0  194,7  210,4  220,0  +  1,  6  +0,9 
P.frica  7,8  10,7  13,0  +  4,6 
• 
+  4,0  13,4  15,9  18,0  +  3,5  +2,5 
Middle  East  1,2  2,7  5,5  +11,9  +15,3  14,5  17,0  ?0,5  +  3,2  +3,8 
Japan  102,3  111,4  110,0  +  1,7  - 0,3  64,8  74,3  80,0  +  2,8  +1,5 
China/North  Korea  26,8  42,9  50,0  + 9,9  +  3,1  31,4  49,1  54,0  + 9,4  +1, 9 
Rest  of  Asia  12,5  24,5  32,0  +14,5  +  5,5  21,4  37,8  46,0  +12,1  +1.,0 
u  S  A  105,3  101,7  110,0  - 0,7  +  1,6  115,8  114,8  124,0  - 0,2  -+i,6 
Canada  13,0  15,9  1.7 ,o  +  4,1  +  1,3  13,3  13,3  13,5  - -+0,3 
Latin  America  18,6  28,8  34,5  +  9,1  +  3,7  29,6  36,6  37,0  +  4,3  ~o,?. 
Oceania  8,1  7,8  IS,S  - 0,6  + 1,7  6,4  7,0  8,0  +  1,8  ~2,7 
E  E  c  125,2  127,7  124,0  + 0,4  - 0,6  98,6  103,8  103,5  +  1,0  -o, 1 
+  + 
I 
I 
! 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~  TOTAL  643,0  716,1  7.:;9 ,5  +  2,2  1,2  640,1  714,5  759,5  2,0  +1,2 
J 
Product  definition:  United  Nations. 
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The  factors  governing  the  ne\v  trend  in  the world  steel  trade  since  1974  appear 
likeli to  continue  their  impact  in  the  years  ahead. 
Some  structural  components  are  already clear: 
- the  increasing  importance  in  terms  of  both production and  consumption of 
the newly  industrialized countries  and  the  developing countries; 
- the  surplus  capacities at world  level,  and  more  particularly in  the 
industrialized  count~ics; 
the  renewed  restructuring effort made  by  the main  producing countries, 
especially Japan. 
The  reference  framework  exhibits  more  uncertainties  than optimistic  signs. 
Three  types  of  factors  appear  likely to  combine  in bringing  about  a  particularly 
difficult environment: 
- in the  period  1980-85  the  world  economy  may  now  be  expected  to  sloH  down, 
while  prospects  beyond  1985  will  be  governed  by  constraints as  yet  undetermined; 
- the  instability of  exchange  rates has  a  direct  impact  on  a  product 
normally  quoted  ~n dollars  on world  markets; 
- government  intervention  to  provide  aid or  to  protect  nation.ai  markets 
sometimes  seriously affects  trade  balances. 
In  ~his climate,  for  the  period  1980-85,  world  steel  consumption  and 
production  (ECSC  and  non-ECSC  products)  are  likely to  record  annual  growth 
rateB  well  below  the  average  for  the  second  half of  the  1970s,  with  a  fall 
from  +2%  to about  +1%. 
Steel production  and  consumption,forecasts  in  the  different  world  submarkcts 
can  be  used  to  draw  up  a  reference  framework  within which  the various 
producers wili  probably have  to  act  (see Table  5). 
Other Western  European countries 
Here  a  small  increase  in  supply  Rnd  demand  and  a  balanced  situation 1n  1985  can 
be  predicted.  Although  the  current  restructuring  in  Spain  and  Sweden  should 
reduce  capacity,  some  increase  in  production  ~s  to  be  expected 
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1.n  Yugoslavia  (Smederevo)  and  in Turkey  (lskenderum),  while  the  doubling  of 
capacities  in Portugal  has  been  postponed  to  1986.  Consumption  may  be 
expected  to pick  up  in  Spain,  where  it remains  extremely  low,  and  in Portugal. 
Eastern Europe 
Some  cxpans1.on  of  capilcity is  planned,  especi:1lly  in  Rumania,  Bulgaria  and 
East  Germany.  Even  if  the  objectives  in  the  plans  arc  not  fully  attained  in 
those  countries,  it  s~cms  r~a1istic  to  pre~ict overall  an  increase of  around 
11  million  tonnes  for  1985.  A  similar rise  1.n  consumption  also  appears  probable 
as  some  expansion of  industrial  production,  especially in  the  way  of  durable 
consumer  goods,  is expected  in  the  USSR. 
Latin America 
It is not  so  much  production  as  internal  consumption  that will  suffer  from  the 
slowing  down  of  developn1ent  and  the  serious difficulties with  the  external 
debt.  The  steel  trade deficit  in  1985  \{auld  thus  be  reduced  to  one  third 
of its level  in 1980. 
Africa 
The  recession  1.n  tile  industrjalizcd  counLries  and  the  external  debt  of  several 
African  countries,  \vhich  has  reached  an  iilarming  level,  are  likely  to  bring  about 
some  slackening  of  the  production  and  consumption  growth  rate  for  1985. 
Japan 
With  production  remaining  st~ady,  a  small  1ncrease  1n  consumption  should 
result  from  the  expected  growth  in  investment  and  consumption  in  the  private 
sector.  Although  seriously  redu~ed,  the  Japanese  positive balance  of  trade 
would  remain  the  largest of all. 
China  and  North  Korea 
The  annual  growth  in consumption  for  1980-85  (one  third  that  recorded  between 
1975  and  1980)  should  be  justified by  the  fact  that  China,  despite  tl1e  downward 
revision of  the objectives  for  the  1976-85  plan,  is still a  large  expanding 
market  and  per  capita steel  consumption  is still amongst  the  lowest  in  the 
world. 
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Rest  of ·Asia 
The  forecasts  of higher production have  been  greatly  reduced  following  the 
decision  by  China  Steel  Corporation of  Taiwan  to  postpone  indefinitely  phase  3 
of  its expansion  programme,  which  wouid  have  incrcas.ed  its crude  steel 
capacity from  3.2 to 5.7 million  tonnes,  AlsQ  the~e is still great uncertainty 
about  the  dates  on  which  the  steel  de;:elopment  plans  in  :Lndia  will  be  put  into 
effect. 
United  States 
Overall  crude  steel production capacity in the United  States is unlikely to 
fall by  1985  since  some  reduction  in integrated  steelmaking will  probably be 
offset by  the later development  of  electric furnaces.  It  seems  reasonable 
to predict  a  capacity utilization of  close  to  80%  in 1985,  which  means 
that  production forecasts  are  slightly up.  A  si.mi lar annual  growth  rate 
for  consumption  does  not  seem  unrealistic  in  view  of  the  prospect  of  a  cyclical 
take  off of  the  American  economy  in  1983.  An  adverse  balance  of  trade  of 
40 million  tonnes  is  close  to  tl1e  average  recorded  over  the  past  five  yeArs, 
Oceania 
As  Australia  ~s an  expanding market  it seems  realistic to predict  a  slight 
increase  in production  and  consumption. 
The  producing areas  having  a  structural  surplus will .rema1n  the  same  in 1985: 
the countries  that  are  forced  to  be  net exporters will still be  Japan  and  the 
Conununity. 
Against  this background  of  world  production  and  consumption  trends,  it seems 
fair to predict  some  shrinkage  in  the  extra-Community  trade  surplus' from 
23.9 million  tonnes  in 1980  to  20.5 million  tonnes  in  1985,  with  a  slight 
\. 
reduction  in  the  gap  separating it from  the  Japanese  surplus  (see  Table  6). 
NET  STEEL  TRADE  OALANCES 
TAilLE  6 
('000  000  tonnesl 
1975 
Western  Europe  (excl.EEO  - 6,11 
Eastern,  Europe  - 2,1 
Africa  - 5,5 
Middle  East  - n,l 
Japan  •  37,5 
I China/North  Korea  - 5,1 
Rest  of  Asia  - 8,9 
U S A  - 10,5 
Canada  - 0,3 
latin America  - 11,0 
OceJnia  +  1,7 
f  E C  +  26,6 
Product  deftn1t1on:  Un1ted  NJt1ons 
1980 
- il,7 
- 1,2 
- 5,2.-
- 14,3 
•  37,1 
- 6,_2 
- 13,3 
- 13,1 
•  2,6  - 7,8 
+  0,8 
•  23,.9 
- =net  importer 
+  = net  exporter 
19i5 
0 
0 
- 5,0 . 
- 15,0 
•  30,0 
- 4,0 . 
- 12,0 
- 14,0 
•  ,3,5 
- 2,5 
•  0,5 
+  20,5 
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In  ECSC  products,  though  reduced,  the  balance  could  rema1n  around  12  million 
tonncs  (see  Table  7). 
THE  c:~~UM!TY'S  ~ET  3ALaNCE  OF  T~ADE  ~!TH  ~ON-~E~SER  C:u~TR!ES 
·r A6LE  7 
c·~:c  CCC  tonnes  of  fi~is~e~  cr~ductsl  111 
1971  197 4  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  193C  1901 
!ngcts  ond  Se'lliS 
- -0,4  -0,2  1,4  -0,3  -0,9  -0'"'  -0,9  -0,3 
nOt  co, l s  .. 
-0,1  0,2  O,Q  -0,8  1,3  2,7  2' 3  2 '1 
~.ea vy  sections  2' 3  3, 1  2,6  1,9  2'  1  2,5  2,0  1,8 
Loght  secticns  3,0  5,2  3,4  i'-,2  2,2  3,3  3,5  2,4 
1Ni re  red  1,3  1,8  1,0  C,3  0,6  1,0  1,1  ':,3 
Strip  0,4  0,4  0,3  0, 2  0,4  G,~  0,5  0,5 
~eavy and  Light  pLate  0,8  1,  7  0,8  -0,2  0,6  1,6  1,2  C,9 
-:ncoated  sheet  2,8  3,9  .>,0  ., "  3,6  4,3  3,0  3,5 
Coated  sr.eet  2,0  2,1  1,6  1,  )  1,7  2,0  1,9  1,5 
TOTAL  12,1  18,1  1G' 7  6,7  11,5  16,9  15,3  1 3,2  16,9 • 
111  ECSC  Products 
*  Estimation 
An  atte;npt  to  1ncrease  the  value  of  exports,  1n  order  to  make  up  for  their  low 
volume,  might  increase  the  favourable  balance  for  coated  sheet  by  a  third 
and  almost  double  the  deficit  for  ingots  and  semis. 
In  1985,  the  largest  favourable  balances  should  be  for  coated  and  uncoated 
sheet  and  coils. 
In  the  medium  term,  the  improvement  of  the  Community's  external  trade  bal.:.1nce 
will  depend  on  its international  competitiveness.  It is  then  necessary 
to  stop  regarding  the  world  ste~l market  as  a  marginal  outlet  mopping  up 
shortfalls  in internal  demand,  and  turn  towards  strategies  that  explicitly 
include  it, not  only  in  the  light of  export  prospects  but  also  as  the  ma1n 
yardstick  for  the  price  and  efficiency levels  on  which  the  adjustment  of 
the  whole  Community  steel  industry  should  be  based. 
./. 
'  196S 
-c,~ 
2,  S·  · 
, , s 
1,'1 
0,8 
0,3 
C,9; 
2,?i 
2,  C· 
12' 1 : -·28-
To  conclude,  it  is  interesting  to  compare  steet trends  of  the  Community,  Japan  and 
the  U.S.  with  export  trends  of  the  principal  products  using  steel  as  a  basic  material 
by  the  same  three  entities. 
Strategy  thus  becomes  clear  which  seems  to  privilege  exports  of  high  value  added 
products  more  than  the  crude  product. 
TAilU  A 
EXPORT  TRENDS  OF  PIG  IRQ~ ANO  STEEL  (value millions  of  EOIJ 
~estination 
---------.:.___ 
Origin  ·----
Europe  10 
U.S.A. 
Japan 
(1>  Extra  E.C. 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1930 
1981 
1975 
1976 
1977 
19711 
1979 
19~0 
1981 
1975 
197t. 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
(2l  ~evelopment countries 
C3l  State economic  countries 
World  (1)  Europe  10  USA 
Cal  Cbl  Cal  Cbl 
1  <a>  (bl 
9.939.  100 
8.4671  85 
9. 541.  96 
7.995  11(1 
12.007  121 
11.826  119 
2.000  100 
1.724  M 
1 ,1,111  74 
1.376  69 
1.lY•  87 
2.266  113 
2 .61.0  132 
>.. 192  lf)O 
9. '·  7~  114 
9. 21 f,  11 3 
9. ~r:·3  114 
1'1.2'/7.  1('6 
11.•l'i9:  ns 
14.·r\[),  1<i2 
152 
188 
128 
142 
1115 
305 
230 
524 
527 
409 
261, 
'.51 
395 
2<5 
100 
124 
84 
93 
109 
201 
151  I 
998 
945 
1,822 
1.857 
1.  61'>2 
1 .25"' 
i  10n  1  1. son 
101  · 1.RAII 
78  2.035 
51  1.879 
68  ; 2 ,(V)•? 
7S  1,9113 
43  3.58fl 
(a)  millions  of  ECU 
(b)  indu  1975  =  100 
100 
95 
183 
186 
167 
126 
100 
124 
131, 
125. 
1)4 
132 
23} 
Japan 
<a>  Cbl 
9 
20 
11 
21 
28 
24 
11 
28 
18 
31 
3K 
38 
39 
100 
222 
122 
233 
311 
267 
100 
255 
164 
282 
:v.s 
34~ 
355 
I>.C.C2l 
Cal  <b> 
3.199  100 
2.470  77 
2.674  84 
3.696  116 
3.797  119 
4.261  133 
1.219  100 
784  64 
659  54 
759  62 
898  74 
1.37l  113 
1.527  125 
4.14/  1n0 
4.121  99 
4.421  107 
4.627  112 
5.275  .  1.'7 
i  6.232  .  1'i0 
L  ~:?  _, s  L~~-: 
Latin America  Class 3  (3) 
(a)  (b)  Cal  Cbl 
791 
371 
464 
735 
635 
768 
467 
397 
326 
382 
500 
81.3 
9oJ 
100  2.911  100 
47  2.637  91 
59  2.355  81 
93  2.925  100 
80  3.276  113 
97  2.546  87 
100 
85 
70 
ll2 
107 
181 
200 
25  100 
52  208 
27  108 
16  64 
127  508 
43  172 
7  28 
852  tOO  1.2)2  1100 
719  84  1 ..  'l48  148 
829  97  1.)44  ·123 
708  83  ,,-1;:\S  hs9 
819  9(,  2. )91  '167 
949  111  1.'\14  145 
_J  1_:2~~..::-21~  ~,,_ ~ 
EXPORT  TRENDS  OF  MACHINERY  AND  TRANSPORT  MATERIAL 
Oes t i nation 
----------- Or-igin  · ·· -- -· ··  ··  --:-----. 
Europe  10  1975 
U.S.A. 
Japan 
<1>  Extra e.c. 
1976 
1977 
1971\ 
1979. 
1980 
1975 
1976 
1977. 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1971\ 
1979 
1911(1 
1981 
World  (1) 
<a>  (b) 
52.285  100 
61.430  117 
69.K37  133 
71.71,1)  137 
76.115  145 
86.K90  166 
37.1/l(,  100 
44.7'>2  1?0 
45.241  121 
41,11.~2  12!1 
B.ll?.l  142 
62. S91\  16R 
88.5'11  23'1 
22,01\7  100 
32.124  145 
39. 21l4  177 
4,.~(.0  197 
!  40.316  182 
51 ,11'\7  231 
77 .~v.  35f1 
C2l  Development  countries 
C3l  State economic  countries 
Europe  10 
(a)  (b) 
6.3132 
7,t.99 
7.915 
9,,36 
11.224 
14.4~5 
18.557 
I  2.524 
'  4.1118 
5. 350 
I  •  '  5. 71? 
1 5. 5 s  1 
i 6,6,2 
'  9.t-49 
i 
100 
11? 
124 
11,t, 
175 
226 
290 
100 
1  (o~ 
21 1 
22t. 
220 
262 
3R2 
u.s.A. 
<a l  Cbl 
5.R16  100 
6.5  70  112 
7.968  137 
9.334  160 
10.461  179 
1l.722  201 
!  4.813 
I  8.221 
10,"147 
12.33~ 
.  12.233 
1  I,. 7'10 
21.55"1 
100 
170 
214 
?.S#o 
254 
3f16 
41,7 
Cal  millions  of  ECU 
(b)  inde~  1975  = 100 
Japan 
<a> 
681 
769 
955 
1.  1 1 1 
1.296 
1.346 
1,H9 
1.576 
1.504 
1.906 
2.1>00 
2.999· 
4.347 
(value millions of  ECU) 
(b) 
100 
112 
140 
163 
1?0 
197 
D.C.C2l 
<a>  (b) 
21.892  100 
26.722  122 
31.,  17  142 
31.968  146 
32.329  147 
37.707  172 
100  13.511 
106  17.307 
101  17.1119 
128  17.529 
175  19.747 
202  .24.38!1 
293  35.186 
100 
128 
127 
129 
146 
180 
260 
10.659  100 
14,435  1 135 
17.761>  i  1M 
19.469.  182 
116.942  1  15R 
121.728  ?03 
'--- .t :\"3. 46.5  :  313 
Latin America 
<al  (b) 
4.008  100 
4.307  107 
4.819  llO 
4.635  115 
5.344  133 
6.214  t55 
5.741 
6.716 
6.684 
7 ,1,27 
8.658 
11. 121 
16,370 
100 
116 
116 
ll9 
1~0 
193 
2SS 
Class  3  (3) 
<a>  ·  (b) 
5.567  100 
5.917  106 
5.969  107 
5.973  107 
6.237  11;? 
6.082  10\1 
743 
745 
535 
544 
630 
654 
624 
100 
100 
72 
73 
84 
88 
83 
1.976 
2.577 
3.248 
3.174 
TOO  .492  100 
I  2.533 
3.633 
5.892 
1~  .324 
164  1,504 
1~0  ..  'IR2 
128  • 798 
183  .SS8 
298  •  ~95 
88 
100 
126 
120 
171 
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EXPORT  TRENDS  Of  NON-ELECTRICAL  MACHINES 
--- ·-· .. 
~tion  World  (1)  Europe10  U.S.A.  Japan 
Origin  ~-----
I Cal  (b)  (a)  (b)  I  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
'  I 
Europe 10  1975  2) ,1,01  I  100  r~.305  11l0  448  100 
1976  ?P. .912  I  1H  2.577  112  482  108 
1977  32.5Y. I  128  ,,081  134  578  129 
1971'1  ~I  •• 2 )')  ns  3.!:185  16?  617  1311 
1979  Yi.  ')t,~  1/,Q  4.448  193  694  155 
1980  40.503  159  4.996  217  726  1fl7. 
1981 
U.S.A.  1975  16.997  11)0  3.1.5'3  100  666  100 
19/6  19.!:1~ 7  11 7  4.029  117  791  119 
1977  19.695  116  4.29~  124  756  114 
197R  <''L ?08  123  I,  .80?.  139  830  125 
1979  i'3.656  139  5.682  164  , .029  155 
1980  ZC1 .t.2t.  173  7. 27~  210  1.296  195 
1981  41.643  245  9.628  278  1.889  284 
Japan  1975  5.1.24  100  613 I  100  772  100 
1976  6.948  128  8oo I  131  1.139  148 
1977  8.394  lt,4  i\36  136  1. 568  ?03 
1978  11.183  206  969•  15/l  12.126  275 
1979  j 1f1.9!i.~  2111  1. 1 )I\  i  1)16  12.21)6  ?f\6 
1980  1 3 .t\::,2  I 241  1 .4  75  :  241  2.444  317 
19g1  I ?0.?87 I  37~  1 .921  J13  !3.906  506 
( 1 ) ' Extra  E. C. 
(2)  Development  countries  <al  millions of  ECU 
(3)  State  economic  countries  (b)  index  197)  =  100 
EXPORT  1RENDS  Of  ELEC1RICAL  KACHINES 
~t.ion·~(::rld  <1:bl 
Origin  ~ 
Europe  10  1975  9.><\4  10f1 
U.S.A. 
Japan 
\97t- 1! .2k[):  125 
1977  ,,_,r3  146 
1978  1).429  157 
1979  1~.0~9  1~3 
1980  17.857  182 
197) 
197(, 
1977 
1978 
1979 
198() 
1981 
197S 
T97f> 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
6.2M  HlO 
>'  .• C,fl?  J3(, 
9.2f10  147 
'f.'·'\'  ~~  1 
11l.~P.1  169 
1/.1.3~.  199 
17 .t.70  279 
4.90  100 
R.S<IS  174 
9_1-:06  198 
10.1145  219 
10.61.4 1215 
1~·~ ~,t,  270 
<'0.01!6  406 
Europe  10  U.S.A. 
( al  (b)  (a)  (b) 
1. 425 
1,791 
1.9">1 
2.>B2 
2.1153 
3.~17 
4.3~7 
680 
1 .1)9 1 
1.  '539 
1.  s~x 
1 .)96 
2 J133 
2.  77~ 
6~4  1f)0 
1\84  129 
94R  1W 
954  1W 
1.·1)7  169 
1.337  195 
100 
126 
14[1 
167 
200 
2~  7 
301! 
100  1.39~ 
160  3.1107 
197  ~.0?3 
2 ~I.  3. 020 
23~  2.  ~I,(, 
2??  2.R.~~ 
~08  1,,913 
100 
216 
?.17 
21l 
1R3 
?D? 
353 
(1)  Extra  E.C. 
( 2)  Oeve lopment  roont r i es 
(3)  State  economic  countries 
(a)  millions of  ECU 
(b)  index  1975  = 100 
Japan 
Ca)  (bl 
105--: 1[)0 
150  1143 
195  186 
222  211 
246  231. 
?59  247 
335  100 
417  1?4 
418  125 
)36  1MI 
7)4  225 
770  230 
1.122  33S 
TABLE  C 
(value  milt ions  of  ECU) 
D.C.  (2)  Latin  America 
<a>  (b)  (a)  (b) 
10.059  :100  2.345  100 
12.01.5  I12D  2.300  9!1 
14. 189  11.1  2.61.8  113 
14.655  11.6  2. :;99  liT 
14.174  141  2.698  11S 
16.329  162  3.529  150 
6.312  100  2.865  100 
7.584  120  3.303  115 
7.454  118  3.21.0  1H 
8.021  127  3.667  128 
9.071  144  4.306  151 
11.710  j186  5.495  192 
17.051  1270 
8.051•  281 
2.781  100  550  100 
3. 532 
1127 
654  119 
4.829  174  852  155 
6.104  219  75 7  138 
'i.750  21'7  Sl.R  154 
6.382 
I  , 
! ?29  935  170 
10.202  :307  L419  258 
TABLE  0 
(value  ~illions of  ECUJ 
D.C.  C2J 
<a l  (bl 
~ Jl~P.  1 on 
s. 564  1:16 
6.92L  1/.9 
7.898  193 
7.nn  1119 
8.553  209 
2.67P  100 
4.021  150 
l.,l.R9  162 
4 ..  1~9  1'.JS 
4.4~9  167 
5.1110  193 
7.661  23,, 
atin America 
(a)  (b) 
676  100 
830  1£'3 
9R9  146 
955  141 
1. 062  15 7 
1.2114  190 
1 .111  100 
1 .480  133 
1.559  140 
1. 623  146 
1.920  173 
2. 3il1  ?.14 
3.1.69  312 
Class  3  (3) 
<a>  (b) 
3.796  100 
I, .297  113 
4.324  114 
4.450  117 
4. 510  119 
4.075  107 
602  100 
611  101 
379  63 
39?.  65 
427  71 
321  53 
362  60 
770  100 
818  106 
972  126 
1. 16l  152 
I 97/,  j127 
1. 45 3  :189 
2.21:1  287 
Class  3  Ol 
(sl  (b) 
779  1 co 
84[1  108 
9~3  121 
998  128 
.062  136 
99/:i  12R 
98 
78 
89 
93 
112 
123 
132 
100 
80 
91 
95  . 
111, 
1?/, 
DS 
1.976 
3.130 
4.084 
4.919 
5.1!14 
6.59!'\ 
9.626 
100  324  100  221,  100 
100 
107 
11.5 
li'O 
~62 
3f>ll 
1)C:  531  164  223 
207  638  197  239 
24'1  695  215  32) 
26<'  738  228  381 
95  SRt. 
.:~J~--
334_j_1.054 
487  1. 600  -- ---
•  Destinat-ion  . World  (l)  I 
~-':·;,,  '~'",\ 
1976  .?0.178.  1181 
1977  22. R'l!l  ;  134 
1978  n.n52l  129 
1979  21,. 437  '  144 
1980  2H.4H7  I  1A7 
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EXPORT  TRENDS  Of  TRANSPORT  MATERIAL 
Europe  10 
(a)  Cb) 
U.S.A. 
(a)  Cb) 
2.826  100 
3.109  110 
3.93R  13? 
1..496  159 
4.856  172 
5.443  193 
Japan 
<a>  .  (b) 
1211  100 
137  107 
182  142 
?72  213 
355  277 
365  2!35 
TABLE  E 
(Value millions of  ECUl 
D.C.  C2l  Latin  America 
Cal 
7.741> 
9.112 
10.003 
9.416 
10.425 
12.302 
( b>  C  a) 
100  986 
118  1.177 
129  1.182 
122  1.081 
135  1.584 
159  1.468 
(b) 
100 
"119 
120 
110 
1t>1 
1~9 
Class  3  <3> 
<aJ  (b) 
992  100 
830  84 
703  71 
525  53 
665  67 
635  64 
u.s.~.  1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
197? 
1980 
1981 
13.927 
16.389 
16.347 
17.491 
18.781, 
20.736 
29.468 
100 
118 
11~ 
126 
155 
11.9 
212 
1.1.99 
1.679 
1.ozr, 
2.152 
2.1>90 
3.667 
4.542 
100 
112 
lOS 
144 
179 
2tt5 
303 
397 
368 
330 
~40 
817 
933 
.336 
100 
93 
83 
136 
206 
235 
336 
4.521 
5.702 
5.246 
5.350 
6.217 
7.498 
100  1.765 
126  1.933 
116  '1.886 
118  2.137 
138  2.432 
166  3.245 
232  4.851 
100 
110 
107 
l21 
133 
184 
275 
43 
56 
68 
sa 
91 
100 
130 
158 
135 
212 
486 
Japan  1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
19110 
191\1 
11.715 
16.582 
20.51)5 
21.528 
18.763 
24.(,fl~ 
36.963 
100 
142 
175 
184 
160 
211 
316 
1.231 
2.297 
3.176 
3.162 
2.R22 
3. 121,  I! 
4.953.: 
100  2.648 
186  4.076 
258  5.756 
257  7.189 
229  7.481 
254  9.4fl1 
. 4CJ2__  ;..J.~· 735 
100 
154 
217 
271 
283 
355 
481 
10.473  . 
5.902  100  1.102 
7.774  132  1.391 
8.853  150  1.757 
8.447  143  1.722 
6.009 L  102  i  946. 
8.749  148  .1.644 
13:~7  _  _3.~  L2_.s~~-_ 
1()0 
12t.' 
159 
15il 
86 
149 
261 
210 
130  ; 302 
I 
4ao  I  1oo 
~~~  l' H 
440  92 
518  1108 
-~1_:-_j  107 
(1)  Extra  E. C.  (a)  millions of  ECU 
(b)  index  1975 =  100  lZJ  Development  countrles 
<3>  State economic  countries 
5.  Production 
a)  Finished  products 
On  the  basis of  internal  consumption  and  external  trade  forecasts,  the  output 
of finished  products  in  terms  of  w-eight  is  likely to fall  by  -3,6  % in  1985 
compared  to 1980. 
For  finished  rolled products,  this fall  would  be  limited  to  -1,8% as  a  slightly 
higher  output  of flat prbducts  ~hould almost  make  up  for  the  reductions  in 
heavy  and  light  sectious  (see· als'o  explanatory table  in the  Annex). 
PRODUCTION  1974 --- 1980  &  1985 
LIQUID  STEEL  FOR  CASTING,  INGOTS  AND  SEMIS  FOR  SALE,  FINISHED  ROLLED  PRODUCTS 
PRODUCTS  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 
STEEL  FOR  CASTING  (1)  2,1  2,0  1,8  1,6  1,6  1,6  1,6 
INGOTS  AND  SEMIS  FOR  SALE  (2)  10,5  11,0  9,7  9,1  11,3  11,5  11,1 
·FINISHED  ROLLED  PRODUCTS 
Coils  (finished products)  8,4  7,2  8,6  10,0  12,0  12,6  11,9 
fleavy  sections  10,5  8,9  9,0  8,7  9,3  8,8  8,4 
Light  sections  25,5  19,8  20,6  19,0  19,4  21,1  19,6 
TABLE  8 
('000 000  tonnesl 
1981  1985 
1,4  1,4 
12,0  9,1 
14,1  12,9 
8,5  7,2 
17,0  17,2 
of  which  concrete  reinforcing  rounds  (9,9)  ( 7 ,9)  <8,6)  (7,7)  (7,  7)  (8,8)  (8,  7)  (7,4)  <7,!>) 
Wire  rod  12,8  9,2  10,4  10,2  11,1  12,1  10,!!  10,5  11,0 
Strip/tube strip  8,2  5,5  7 ,-,  6,4  6,6  7,1  6,0  5,2  4,9 
Heavy  and me<fiump late  17,6  14,5  12,5  12,3  12,6  13,0  12,5  12,8  12,3 
Sheet  29,3  21,7  26,8  27,4  28,0  29,2  26,3  26,1  20,.5 
TOTAL  112,4  86,9  95,0  94,0  99,0  104,0  95,5  94,2  "93,d 
GRANO  TOTAL  124,9  100,0  106,5  104,7  1-11,9  117,0  108,2  107,7  10 4,3 
(1)  Including  production  of  i-ndependent  steel  foundries. 
C2)  Excluding  those  for  rolling or  re-rolling  1n  the  COMMunity,  but  including  ingots  and  semis  for  tubes. - 3"T  -
i>)  1:! Ltdc  ·.: e.•:  b.:1l nnce 
The  rapid  f',t·owtlo  i.n  continuous  C:Jsting  makes  it particularly difficult  to 
compat:e  cntde  steel output  from  one  yeat:  to  another  because  of  the  savings 
in ingot  steel.  Over  a  long  period,  trends  in crude  steel  production 
underestimate  the  real  increase  in  finished  products. 
In  the  crude  steel  balance,  continuous  casting production potential  for  1985 
1s  based  on  the  compan;  returns  corrected  by  the  historical  trend.  One 
aim of  the  Community  steel  industry  must  be  to  obtain  as  soon  as  possible 
a  maximum  continuous  casting output  amounting  to  some  85-90%  of  the 
necessary crude  steel  production potential,  well  above  the  figure  of  69  % that 
can  now  be  predicted  for  1985. 
l.  H;GOT  EOUl'JALE~o,iT 
."ar"iat 10n  \r.  sto-.:h 
hports  (l) 
r~:::.orts 
Scrap  :~n5u"".pt icn  in 
rottir.g mills 
Production  Hl  1ngot 
C'qu i  ~o:a t e~t 
1974 
(1}  l31,2 
l2l  1,0 
34,3 
7' 4 
0,2 
158,9 
~I.  CCIHH::SPc~:DING  CPUD'E  STEEL  PI;IQDUCI !ON 
.Contlnuous  ca-st1ng 
production  potential 
Continuous  <:a'St ing 
production 
Continuous  c a·H ing 
correct lon 
(3) 
(4) 
(51 
22,9 
19,0 
3,3 
Crude  steel  production  <6)  155,5 
1975 
1  ~, ,4  - ~  ~, 
2:,8 
7, 8 
0,2 
33,4 
20,7 
3,6 
125,6 
CRUDE  SHEL  8ALANCE 
1076 
12'4,2 
+  5, 7 
2l  ~ ') 
, 2,4 
0,2 
138,8 
42,6 
27,2 
4,8 
1977 
117,8  - ,  , , 
27,7 
12, ~ 
0,2 
\31,7 
5,6 
126,1 
1978 
118,, 
- o,  7 
33,2 
1\,, 
0,2 
139,3 
54,9 
38,6 
6,7 
132,6 
1979 
12 (> 0 
•.1,"5 
3?, I 
11,6 
0,2 
14 7,8 
58,7 
43,7 
7,6 
140,2 
TABlE  Q 
{ •:u  ...  · ud  t.:.nnes) 
1980 
120, 7 
- 0, 7 
23,3 
11,6 
0,2 
136,5 
70,9 
50,0 
8,8 
127,7 
! 
I 
1981  1 
117  ,.e. 
- 3,6 
29,9} 
8,1 
0,2  i 
I 
13),3 
81 ,5 
56,6 
9,9 
125,4 
15,0 
110 
82,5 
14,4 
119,7  ! 
I,  .. 
L_  ________________  _JL_  ____  JL  ______  -L~~--L-------L-------L-------~------~·------J-----~r 
(  1)  For  the  forecasting  year  conversion  coefficient  equals  1.290. 
(2)  Stocks  l"ield  by  producers  and  ll'.erchants. 
(3)  Figur~  for  1985  lS  estimated 
(4)  Assumed  rate of  utHizatiOn of  production  potential  75  X  in  198S. 
C'S)  Savings  in  ingots  obtained  by  continuous  c:asting  production:  continuovs casting  output  x  0.175, 
(6)  Ingot  production - continuous  casting  correct ion. 
./. - 32  -
c)  Development  of  mini-mills 
In  the  context  of  production  structures, the  role of  mini-mills  in  the  current 
stage  of  development  of  the  European  steel  industry  should  be  more  carefully 
examined.  This  type  of  works  seems  Likely  to develop  and  to  complement  the  inte-
grated  works. 
The  need  to  restructure  the  European  steel  industry  inevitably  means  that  the 
role  of  mini-mills  in  this  new  structure  has  to  be  defined. 
The  fact  that  mini-mills  have  obtained  more  satisfa~tory economic  results than 
integrated  works, indicates  that  in  the  future  they  could  handle  the  production 
of  all  the products  in  the  range  that  they  are  already producing  successfully 
today.  The  integrated  works  would  then  of  course  have  to  be  restructured 
accordingly. 
Mini-mills  have  the  edge  over  integrated  steelworks  in  a  number  of  factors 
such  as  : 
- very  low  investment  cost 
- simple  administration 
- inexpensive  sales organization. 
Then  there  is  also  the  enormous  technical  progress  made  in  electric  steelmaking 
over  the  past  few  years  : 
reduction  in  electrode  and  electricity  consumption  (around  30%)  and  increase 
in  productivity  (up  to  100%). 
Nevertheless  the  most  importan~ factor  in this  favourable  situation  is the 
price  of  scrap. 
For  the  molten  steel  cost  to  be  the  same  in  the  blast  furnace  - 9xygen  plant 
system  as  in  the  mini-mills,  the  price  of  scrap  ~ould have  to  be  as  follows 
(without  consideration  of  quality)  : 
P  0.85  x P(pig>  +  Co2  - eel 
<scrap)  =  - - 0.8  X  1.05-
Where 
P  <scrap)  is  the  price of  scrap 
p(pig)  is the  price  of  pig  iron 
C02  is the  production  cost  in  an  oxygen  plant 
eel  is the  production  cost  in  an  elettri~ furnace - 33  -
The  average  scrap  price  is  about  40  ECU  below  this break-even  price. 
Obviously  this  advantage  varies  within  a  fairly  wide  range  depending  on 
individual  geographical,  technical  and  economic  situations. 
The  advantage  and  competitiveness  that  mini-mills  hnve  over  integrated  works 
quickly  fall  if scrap  price  rise.  Experience  shows,  however~  that  these  rises 
occur  solely  in  conjuQction  with  corresponding  increases  in  steel  prices, 
I 
which  means  that  a  satisfactory profit  margin  is  maintained. 
This  makes  it  clear that  the  question  of  r :ni-mills  is  closely  linked  to  the 
problem  of  scrap.  In  the  case  of  Europe,  1here  is no  need  to  delve  into  the 
question  of  sponge  iron  that  could  be  used  in  mini-mills  as  an  alternative 
raw  material  since,  quite  apart  from  the  question  of  its availability  in  suf-
ficient  quantities, this product  could  not  be  sold  below  130  ECU  a  tonne,  wich 
is  about  double  the  current  average  scrap  price. 
The  problem  of  scrap  may  be  examined  from  three  aspects 
- quality 
-general  availability  and  changes  in  the  requirements  of  different  user 
sectors 
- regional  availability 
Here  the  quality  of  scrap  is of  interest  only  insofar  as  it  restricts the 
range  of  products  produced  by  mini-mills.  In  general  these  works  confine 
themselves  to  producing  three-major  categories  : 
- concrete  reinforcing  rounds 
- other  light  sections 
- wire  rod. - 34  -
·There  is no  doubt  that  the  quality of  the  scrap  would  allow  100%  of  the 
concrete  reinforcing  rounds  to  be  produced  in  mini-mills. 
As  for  the production  of  other  Light  sections  and  wir~ rod,  there  are  no 
precise statistics on  quality  but  numerous  expert  findings  indicate  that  at 
least  60%  of  this production  could  also  be  turned out  by  mini-mills. 
If  these  are  taken  as"reference  figures  for  1985,  it  would  be· theoretically 
possible  for  the  mini-steelworks  to produce  the  following  : 
- concrete  reinforcing  rounds 
- other  Light  sections  9.7 x  0.6 
- wire  rod  11.0 x  0.6 
7.S million  tonnes 
5.B  million  tonnes 
6.~ million  tonnes· 
19.~ million  tonnes 
Assuming  a  capacity utilization  rate  of  85%  and  a  metal  yield of  90%,  a 
capacity  of  26.0 million  tonnes  would  be  needed  for  this output. 
A survey  of  capacities gives  a  figure  of  only  20.1  million  tonnes  for  1981. 
On  the  basis  of  this  figure  it  seems  that  some  additional  development  of 
mini-mills  would  be  possible.  Nevertheless,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that 
capacity  returns  are  very  conservative. 
Unfortunately  the  works  do  not  generally  correct  their  capacity  figures  when 
they  increase  productivity  and  it  is  preci~ely in  this sector that,  as  men-
tioned  above,  productivity  has  been  substantially  improved. 
In  the  light  of  what  has  been  said  above,  it  would  be  very  risky  to  encourage 
the  construction  of  new  mini-mills  from  the  point  of  view  of  overall  capacity. 
This  does  not  mean  that  capacity  revision  at  regional  level  would  be  desirable. 
However,  before  tackling  this problem  it  is necessary to  investigate  whether 
there  would  be  sufficient  scrap  available  for  this expansion. 
Availability 
For  the present  purposes,  trends  in  marketed  strap  only  will  be  considered. 
In  1974,  the  volume  of  scrap  sold  reached  a  max~mum at  approximately  37  million 
tonnes.  Extrapolation  of  that  figure  would  give  approximately  47  million  tonnes 
for  1985. - 35  -
Since  steel  consumption  within  the  Community  has  not  reached  ~i1e  expected 
level, this  figure  has  to  be  revised  to  approximately  42  million  tonnes. 
Even  this  revised  figure  appears  highly  optimistic  in  comparison  with  the 
actual  figure  for  1982  of  about  33  million  tonnes. 
Obviously  this  figure  does  not  reflect  real  availabilities  since  it  is 
distorte~ both  by  Low  demand  and  by  a  price  level  that  di~courages recovery. 
I 
This  means  that  the  level  of  42  million  tonnes  c0uld  possibly  be  reached  but 
that  it  would  be  extremely  dangerous  to  take  a  higher  f  gure  as  a  basis. 
-Trend  in  the  requirements  of  the  various  l.~er  sectors 
Scrap  is  used  by  the  following  sectors 
- blast  furnaces 
- oxygen  steel  plant 
- electric  furnaces 
- mini-mills 
- special  sieels 
- tube  manufacture1s 
- steel  foundries 
- iron  foundries 
- exports. 
In  blast  furnaces,  consumption  has  already  fallen  to  a  very  low  level  and 
may  be  regarded  as  negligible  for  the  future. 
Scrap  consumption  in  oxygen .steel  plant  is  very  fluid,  varying  between  80 
and  300  kg  scrap  per  tonne  of  steel. 
The  reduction  of  process  scrap  with  the  introduction  of  continuous  casting 
could  therefore  be  offset  by  a  reduction  in  specific  input.  However,  it  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  a  specific  input  of  between  200  and  300  kg  of  scrap  can 
be  converted  into  steel  almost  without  cost.  At  Least  from  the  energy  viewpoint, 
it  would  be  uneconomic  to  reduce  the  specific  scrap  input  in  oxygen  steel  plant. 
Assuming  that  the  current  input  is  maintained,  these  steelworks  would  become 
net  scrap  purchasers  and  under  those  conditions  about  10  million  tonnes  of  scrap 
would  have  to  be  earmarked  for  that  purpose. - 36  -
With  regard to  special  steels, the  proportion  produced  in  oxygen  steel plant 
is  Likely  to  increase, especially  with  the  introduction  of  Ladle-metallurgy, 
and  consequently  scrap  requirements  in  this  sector  may  decline  slightly. 
Consumption  is  Likely  to  remain  more  or  less  steady  in electrical  melting 
shops  producing  semis  for  tube  man4Jacture. 
The  same  is  true  of  steel  foundries. 
Activity  in  iron  foundries  is declining.  Nevertheless, the price difference 
between  new  foundry  pig  iron  and  scrap  is sufficient to encourage  foundries 
to  make  maximum  use  of  scrap.  Consequently they  must  be  expected  to  use  the 
same  quantity  of  scrap  as  today  even  if their activity does  not  continu~ to 
decline. 
Up  to  1977  the  European  Community  was  a  net.  scrap  importer.  Sirice  then  the 
situation  has  changed  and  in  1972  net  exports  amounted  to  about  2  million 
tonnes. 
On  the  basis of  the  above  considerations,  we  have  adopted  three  hypotheses 
for  scrap  requirements  other  than  in  mini-mills  in  order  to ascertain  the 
quantity  that  will  remain  available  for  mini-works. 
Pessimistic 
hypothesis 
for  mini-mills 
MilL ion  tonnes 
Total  scrap  . 
available  42,0 
Blast  furnace 
consumption  0,6. 
Oxyg~n converter 
consumption  10,0 
Electric  melting  16,8 
shops  and  foundries 
excluding· mini-works 
(60%  utilization of 
existing  capacity) 
Iron  foundries  4,0 
Net  exports  2,0 
Available  for 
mini-mills  8,6 
Mean  hypothesis 
f o r  m  i n,i-m  i l l s 
Mill ion  tonnes 
42,0 
0 
6,0 
16,8 
3,5 
1,0 
14,7 
Optimistic  hypothesis 
for  mini-mills 
Mill ion  tonnes 
42,0 
0 
3,0 
16,8 
3,0 
0 
19,2 - 37  -
Even  under  the  best  possible  conditions,  the  scrap  available  w;LL  obviously 
not  be  sufficient  for  the  total  output  of  the  products  for  wich  the  mini-mills 
are  best  suited  technologically.  Consequently  so~e  reinforcing  rounds,  Light 
sections  ano  wire  rod  would  still  have  to  be  produced  in  integrated  works. 38 
6.  Raw  materials  and  scrap 
a)  Raw  materials 
By.  1985  and  1990,  world  ~ron ore  output  could  develop  as  follows! 
TABLE  10 
IRON  ORE  PRODUCTION 
('000 000  tonnes) 
1980  1985  1990 
I 
European  Community  35,2  28,2  27,0 
Sweden  28,5  26,0  25,0 
Rest  of  Europe  18,6  20,9  21,9 
U S  A  77,8  73,0  68,0 
Canada  51,2  50,0  ·'  50,0  . 
Brazil  91,5  102,0  140,0 
Mexico  and  rest  of  South  A:nerica  4Cl,3  l}3,4  46,2 
Africa  64,6  71,8  92,6 
India  40,0  47,0  50,0 
Rest  of  Asia  2,0  2,1  2,8 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  106,0  106,0  112,0 
China  and  ~!orth  Korea  81,0  86,0  90,0 
u s  s  R  249,..0  260,0  270,..0 
Other  State-trading  companies  11,7  14,6  14,5 
TOTAL  ROUNDED  OFF  ;  895  930  1 O'i 0 
With  a  safety margin  of  10%,  the  supply  and  demand  balance  should move 
towards  equilibrium point  after.the enormous  supply  surplus  of  1980. 
TABLE  11 
BALANCE  OF  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND  FOR  IRO~  ORE 
('000  000  tonnes) 
Supply  Demand 
r-
1980  695  805 
1985  930  910  - 950 
1990  1010  1 • 000  - 1. 050 
In  the  community,  the  foreseeable  trend  in steel output  should  in 1985  result 
~nan ore  demand  of  130 million  tonn~s  compared  with  a 
consumption  of  146.8 Million  tonnes  in  1980. 
. I. ...  39  -
Assumi~1g that  internal  ore  production  falls  to  28.2  million  tonnes,  the  balance 
to  be  c.ovcred  would  he  at  1  o1,  s·  mi. 11 ion  lunne  s  compared  \vi t h 
actual  imports  of  115  million  tonnes  in  1980. 
The  Community  steel  industry is  now  participating directly in five mining 
projects  in non-member  countries;  however,  most  of  its supplies  are  guaranteed 
'  by  long-term supply  contracts.  ThcJt'  seems  likely  to  be  few  changes  in  this 
situation  u1  the  immediate  future,  but  in  ~he medium  term  the  Conununity' s 
financial  contribution  to  projects  in non-member  countries  could  be  an 
additional  factor  helping  to  stabilize its  supply. 
b)  Scrap 
To  cover  their  scrap  requirl'mcnts,  compnnies  mainly  use  their  own  circulating 
scrap.  Until quite recently  this  source  accounted  for!~O% of  the  total 
Conununity  supply. 
This  proportion will,  however,  change  considerably with  the  spread  of 
continuous  casting,  which  reduces  mvn  scrap  arisings.  The  installation of 
continuous  casting  in  a  typical  integrated  works  on  average  increases  the 
need  for  bought  scrap  (+  ] 15  kg  per  tontH?.  of  finished  product),  while 
the  combination  of  continuous  casting  \·rith  an  electric melting  shop  reduces 
the  need  for  bought  scrap  (-40  kg  per  tonne  of  finisl1cd  products). 
Assuming  a  specific  scrap  consumption of  240  kg  in  LD  converters,  a  total 
continuous  casting weight  of  70%  (81%  for  electrical melting  shops  and 
66%  for  oxygen  steel  plant)  and  supposi11g  that  26%  of  total  production  comes 
from  electric melting  shops,  boijght  scrup  requirements  woL1ld  amount  to 
42.0  Million  tonnes  in  1985. 
TAbLE  12 
BOUGHT  SCRAP  RfQti!RE~1F.NTS  !N  19115 
--.--· 
'-
_  __:_~-
Products  Bought  scrap 
boug  Process  Crude  steel  production  reQuired  for  sale  per 
tonne  of  product  sera 
Electric  31,& of  "hich  t25, 0  continuous  casting  22,7  ( 1 .069)  21,, 
S,B  in  ingots  4,S  ( 1.  109)  5, 
('000  000  tonn~•l 
I 
~ 
0 
Oxygen  87,.; of  which  ~57 5  continuous  casting  52,4  (  180)  9,t. 
30:0  in  ingots  23 ,.3  (  oSJ  1,  5 
Steel  foundries  1,4  1,4  (  !!30)  1,  2  - ...  ~-
Blast  furnaces  0, 
TOTAL  11 '), 7  11 '), 7  10J.,9  ~?, 
-
0  ___ j 
. I. _  _;,  40  -
Total  scrap  resources  available  for  the  steel  industry 1n  the  Community  should 
amount  to  41.6 million  tonnes  in  1985;  by  then,  supply  and  demand  should  be 
more  or  less  in balance. 
SCRAP  REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  TABLE  13 
(
1000  000  tonnes) 
1974  1975  1976  19l7  1978  1985  I  ------r-------1-------f------- ------ ------
I  Crude  steel  production  <Liq.st.excl.)  153,5  123,5  132,2  124,4  131 ,o  118,3 
64,7  54,1  57,7  55,0  59,1  53,:;  i  Scrap  consumption  . 
31,0  26,1  25,9  24,9  24,3  13,1  I  Own  circulating  scrap  ------1-------f------- ------ ~------ ------ --------~------------------------------
Bought scrap requirements in steel plant  33,7  28,0  31,8  30,1  34,8  40,2 
Consumption  in  foundries  1,6  1,6  1,5  1,4  1,3  1,2 
Consumption  in blast  furnaces  2,2  1,8  1,7  1,6  1,4  0,6 
--------------------------------------- ------f-------f------- ------1------- ------
Total  requirements  37,5  31,4  35,0  33,1  37,5  42,0 
New  process  scrap  15,2  13,9  13,E 
Capital  scrap  21,2  17  ,o  27,E 
-----------------~--------------------- --------------------f------- ------f------
Total  internal  resources  36,4  30,9  41 ,6 
~-------------------------------------- --- ... --1--------------f------- ------ ------
Requirements  not  covered  by  1,1  0,5  I  internal  resources 
In  terms  of  quantity,  no  energy  supply difficulties are  expected  up  to  1985. 
The  more  complicated  and  relatively more  important  ease  of blast  furnaces 
calls for more  detailed  comme-nt. 
a)  Energy  consumption  1n  the  bl~~t furnace 
Energy  consumption  in  the  blast  furnace  (including  ore  preparation)  fell  from 
23.7  gigajoules  per  tonne  of  pig  iron  in  1974  to  22.9  gigajoules  in  1980,  a 
reduction  of  about  12%.  For  the  period  1981-85,  a  slow  but  steady  reduction 
in specific energy  consumption may  again  be expected;  it should  fall  by 
approximately  a  further  10%  to  a  level  of  around  19  gigajoules.  However,  gas 
and  electricity requirements will rise  from  2.24  gigajoules  in  1980  to 
2.4  gigajoules  in  1985  and  therefore  solid  and  liquid  fuel  requirements 
should  amount  to  16.6 gigajoules  per  tonne  of pig  iron  in  1985. 
. I. 
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b)  Blast-furnace  energy  su_pplies 
If  the injection of  liquid  and  gaseous  fuels  1s  abandoned,  around  42  million 
tonnes  of  coke  will  be  required  to  cover  pig  iron production  requirements 
in 1985.  Coke-oven  operators  estimate  that  the  Community's  coking  capacity 
should  be  73  million  tonnes  a  year  by  1985,  with  an  output  of  up  to 
65  million  tonnes  adequate  to  meet  demand  from  the  steel  and  other  industries 
and  for  exports. 
c)  Energy  conservation  (l) 
Energy  accounts  for  about  30%  of  steel  production costs  in  integrated  steelworks 
and  20%  in electrical melting  shops.  Its ultimate  impact  depends  on  energy 
prices but  can  be  reduced  by  rational  utilization;  the  energy  savings  obtainable 
in 1985  may  be  estimated  at  at  least  7-8%  (5-6 million  tonnes  a  year)  of  1979 
consumption.  This will  be  achieved  by: 
using  raw materials  that  are  optimum  from  the  energy  viewpoint; 
- more  efficient energy management,  e.g.  heat  recovery; 
- returning  to  energy  recovery  teclmiquos  such  as  the  recovery  of  blast 
furnace  gas  from  high  top  pressure  operation  and  of  converter  gas. 
Stagnating steel  output  in  the  Community  combined  v.'ith  slack  internal 
consumption  and  an  industry not  competitive, enough  to  increase  its exports 
would  not  in  themselves  have  brought  about  the  structural  imbalance  if 
at  the  same  time  productioi1  capacity  had  not  increased  substantially  since 
1974,  leading  to  a  ser1ous  and  persistent  gap  between  supply  and  demand. 
a)  The  ma1n  causes  of  the  imbalance 
The  capacity  arose  from  a  combination  of  specific  capacity decisions  taken 
just before  the  crisis hit  and  gains  in productivity  from  restructuring  and 
rationalization n1easures  taken  as  soon  as  the  structural nature  of  the 
crisis became  evident. 
i)  The  selling prices during  the  1973-74  boom  had  encouraged  many 
producers  to keep  in  production or  even  to  restart marginal  and 
inefficient plants. 
ii)  During  the  same  period,  extcn~ivc  investment  programmes  to  1nc:rPnse 
capacity  had  been  decided  on  since  demand  was  expected  to  contin11c 
growing;  it  1 s  cstinl.1tl~d  that  thesv  programmes  led  to  a  net  capacil~y 
increase  of  about  15%  over  1973. 
(1)  The  Community  steel  industry  accounts  for  about  8%  of  total  primary  energy 
consumption  in  the  Community  and  20%  of consumption  by  industry. 
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iii) The  resttucturing  and  rationalization measures  taken  since  1975  have 
produced  a  leap  forward  ~n plant  productivity.  Between  1972  and  1980 
tonnage  yield  increased  by  an  average  of  47%  for  blast  furnaces, 
oxygen  converters  and  arc  furnaces,  69%  for  continuous  casting  and 
105%  for  strip mills.  With  production  remaining  steady,  this 
improvement  in  productivity released  capacity  surpluses  that  alone 
more  than cancelled  out  plant  closures. 
Since  1974,  therefore,  enormous  imbalances  have  been created between  supply 
and  demand  in. all  the  main  product  categories.  On  average  installed 
production capacity has  exceeded  l1y  23%  for  crude  steel  and  27%  for  finished 
products  the  theoretical  capacity  required  to  meet  production requirements 
at utilization rates of  85%  and  80%  respectively. 
structural  surpluses  worsened  (see  Table  14). 
In  1980  and  1981,  these 
TABLE  11. 
TRENDS  IN  SURPLUS  PRODUCTION  CAPACITY 
('000 000  tonnes  and  Xl 
Year  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 
Products  t  Y.  t  X  t  X  t  X  t  X  t  ~  t  r. 
I  CRUDE  STEEL  -~,0  -2,2  ~2,0  22,1  39,9  ·20,2  52,3  26,1  ~6,1  22,8  37,9  18,6  52,1  25,7 
I I  FINISHED  PRODUCTS 
Light  and  heevy  sect ions  0,4  0,8  11,7  23,0  11,8  22,9  13,2  26,3  12,6  2~,9  9,6  19,6  1?,1  24,7 
(+  tube  semisl 
1/ire  rod  -0,6  -3,9  s,o  30,7  3,7  22,2  4,8  27,3  4,8  24,3  3,1  16,4  14,8 25,1 
Strip and  tube  strip  0,6  5,5  4,1  37,3  3,0  25,2  4,0  33,3  4,1  33,1  3,2  26,2  '  4,0  34,8 
Hat-rolled sheet  & plate  0,3  1,3  5,7  23,7  9,2  36,7  10,8  40,9  11,3  41,2  9,9  35,5  10,2  37,1 
Cold-rolled  sheet  &  plate  1,8  4,8  13,5  33,4  8,0  19,4  8,8  20,6  8,2  19,1  7,5  17,1  11,6  26,1 
~  2,3  1,7  39,8  27,9  35,6  24,3  42,0  28,2  41,0  27,0  33,6  22,1  42,8  28,3 
Ill  COILS  -1,5  -2,7  18,5  30,2  9,6  15,2  12,0  17,9  9,3  13,7  7,9  11,3  16,0 21,9 
N.B.  The  assumed utilization  rate  is  85%  far  crud~ ~~eel and  80%  for  finished  products. 
Consequently  the  Conununity  steel  industry has  been unable  to  adapt  its 
structures  to  a  market  no  longer  exl1ibiting  high  and  lasting growth,  but 
showing  more  and  more  signs  of  instability. 
b)  Wider  adverse  effects 
It is not  so  much  sluggish  demand  as  investment  d~cisions  (which  have  not 
been corrected or  compensated  by  shutting down  marginal  plant)  and 
improved  prodtJctivity  (substantial  but  insufficient  to  restore  real 
competi tivencss)  that  must  be  blamed  for  creatine  thi.s  vicious circle, 
the  harmful  impact  of which  is intolerable  for  several  reasons: 
. I. 
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1981 
t  ~ 
50,3  25,4 
15,9  31,6 
6,0  30,!!. 
'·,4  4U,4 
9,6 34,8 
11,4  25,9 
47,3  3W 
14,9 20,3 
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i)  Uti1ization rates  have  declined  substantially  1n  the  Community.  For 
crude  steel,  they have  dropped  from  87%  in  1974  to  an  average  of  65% 
s1nce  thr1t  date,  .:md  there  was  a  further  fall  in  1980-81.  Compared  to 
a  theoretica1  utilization of  100%,  the  specific  impact  of  these  rates 
may  he  estimated  to  add  <Hound  22%  to  operating eusts  (exc1mling  financial 
costs  anc.l  taxes),  a  burc.len  equivalent  to  the  cost  Jifferenee  between 
the  lowest  ef[crtive  utili~htion rate  (55%)  and  the  highest  (95%). 
Ovet·  tliat  pcr:iod,  therefore,  the  Coonm'mity  industry  was  at  a  great 
.disadvantage  in  comparison  to  the  US  industry,  ~1ich succeeded  in 
maintaining  a  capacity utilization of  between  85  and  90%.  Although 
the  Japanese  industry  experienced  a  similar fall  to  the  Cvmmunity,  it 
managed  to  reduce  the  impact  substantially by  achieving major  impro-
vements  1n  performance  for  the  other  prime  cost  components;  at present. 
the  break-even  point  in Japan  1s  close  to  a  capacity utilization of  60%. 
ii)  The  average  technical  quality  of  the  plant  has  suffered  because  obsolete 
plant  has  been  kept  in  service,  and  as  a  result  plant  replacement  and 
moclerni~:Jtion  is  lagging  hchind  the  Japanese  industry,  which  ha~  shut 
clO\vn  much  obsolete~  cap<:~city  .:md  replaced  it Hith  modern  plant  (the  figures 
for  1977  to  mid-1979,  for  example,  were  -23.2  and  +22.6  million  tonnes 
respectively).  The  percentage  of  plant  elas sified  as  technical]  y 
obso1ele  by  internatione~l  st.'lnd:.trds  is  much  higher  111  the  Community 
than  in Japan,  Hhile  the  reverse  situotion is  found  for  technieally 
excellent  plnnl  (1).  In  tenus  of  opcr,ating  costs,  the  difference 
between  exce1lent  and  obsolete  plant  is  on  average  around  25%: 
together  with  the  capacity utilizotion rate,  this  has  the  greatest 
unit  impact.  Even  though  the  ECSC  inc.lustry  has  got  rid of  its basic 
Tl!OHi\S  converters  and  almost  all  of  its open-heart  furnaces,  light 
plate  and  sheet mills,  there  are  large  gaps  between  the  average 
technic:<1l  levels  in  the  Community  and  Japan  for  the  main  phases 
of  the  steel  production process  (Table  15), 
(1)  The  p1ant  in  62  steel  comp<1n1es  accounting  for  88%  of  Con@unity  ordinary 
stec1  outp11t  in  19/9-80  h:1vc  her~n  comp<In·d  with  that  of  .Japanese  compan] es 
accounting  for  a  similar  pc·n~l'IIL;q.',L~  of  .L1pancse  output.  For  ertclt  str1ge  i.n 
the  production  cycle,  specific  cva1uatiou criteria  (age,  dimension,  special 
characteristics affecting plant  efficiency),  wei~hted according  to  their 
impact  on  competitiveness,  have  been  used  to  classify plant  at  five  levels 
of  technical  performance  ranging  from  excellent  to  poor. 
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TECHNICAL  LEVEL  OF  STEEl  PLANT  IN  TilE  COMMUNJTY  AND  IN  JAPAN  IN  1980  (*)  - -
Total  Cdp.JCiti('S  r.  of  capacity  classified as; 
Type  of  pldnt  examined 
1•  1- 2+  2  (million  tonnes)  (eHellent J  (avPragP.l  -
BLAST  FURNACES  E  E c  132,8  20  13  12  22 
JAPAN  156  1  58  15  12  7 
OXYGEN  CONVERTERS  E  E  c  53,6.  36  37  23  5 
JAPAN  64  6  51  35  10  4 
WIDE  HOT  STRIP  ~1! LL S  E E  c  70  23  16  32  24 
J  API~U  53  I, 
J  42  :>1  9  12 
PLATE  MlLLS  E  E c  15,2  20  8  24  35 
JAPMI  21,2  82  10  8  0 
E E c  34,2  8  26  29  27 
COLD  ROLLING  MILLS  JAPAN  23  2  44  23  10  17 
(*)  In  some  cases  the  most  recent  data  available  on  mills  date  from  1977. 
The  gap  is particularly large  for blast  furnaces,  which  account  for 
around  60%  of  production  costs  (excluding  d~preciation and  fin~ncial 
costs)  at  the  semis  stage;  in  the  Conm1unity  their  average  productivity 
Hf:lLf  15 
3 
(poor) 
32 
8 
0 
0 
s 
5 
13 
0 
10 
6 
is only one-third  that  in Japan,  mainly  because  of  their  smaller dimensions 
and  lower  energy yield. 
In continuous  casting too,  the  Communi.ty  is  lagging Hell  behind  at  only  39% 
production  compared  with  71%  in  Jap~n.  Because  of its more  recent 
introduction  and  the  scattered  inst~tllations,  continuous  casting  in  the 
Community  is also at  a  cost  disadvantage  compared  to Japan,  estimated 
at  about  12%  for  a  sample  represen.t ing  65%  of  total  continuous  casting 
capacity. 
The  only  Conununity  installations  that  are  technically more  efficient 
than  in Japan  are electric 'furnaces.  Overall,  the percentage  of 
obsolete plant  in  the  Con®unity's  total production  capacity  is 
approximately equivalent  to  the  capacity  surplus,  so  that  the  degree 
of modernization  of  the  plant  sufficient  to meet  demand,  provided  the 
most  efficient plant  is selected,  is  remarkably  close  to  that  of  the 
Japanese  and  well  above  that of  the  North  American  steelmakers. 
iii) Although  the  incidence  of  surplus  capacity  on  costs varies  according 
to  the  structure  of  the  company  concerned  and  although it can  be 
offset at  microeconomic  level  by  savings  on  other costs  factors,  its 
adverse  effect  on  selling prices  is widespread  and  persistent. 
. I. 
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Because  of  the  narn.n.:  gross margins  ~n the  industry,  any  change  ~n the  relation 
between prices  and  costs  has  a  major  impact  on  company  results.  This  is what 
happened  ~n  the  Comnnmi.ty  up  to  mid-1981:  the  companies'  efforts  to  increase 
sales  so  as  to  share  fixed  costs  caused  them  to  base  prices  on  marginal 
rather  than  total  costs.  The  widening  gap  between  total  costs  and  those 
selling prices  was  reflected  in  the  final  disastrous  results. 
In  the  Community,  the  combination  of  adverse  factors  more  or  less directly 
linked  to  surplus  capacity is  therefore  intolerable:  from  the  cost  aspect 
alone,  the  cumulative  disadvantnge  in  terms  of  operating  costs  from  the 
combination  of  obsolete  plant  and  rock  bottom utilization rates  (55%), 
compared  to  the  combination  of  excellent  plant  and  a  peak  effective utilization 
rate  (95%),  is  on  average  about  47%  and  may  go  up  to  60%. 
To  have  an  idea  of  the  relative  importance  of  these  two  factors  it is 
sufficient  to  compare  them  with  other variables:  the  gap  between  European 
and Japanese  average  hourly  labour  costs  adds  an  average  of  7%  to  operating 
costs,  while  the  difference  between  energy  costs  for  Community  producers 
(including  subsidies)  and  for  American  producers  amounts  to  an  insignificant 
disadvantage  of  1%. 
To  judge  from  the  1981  investment  survey  iri  the  Community  and  the  production 
needed  to meet  foreseeable  demand,  the  overall  imbalances  between  demand 
and  supply will  continue.  In  1985  they  could  amount  to  29%  for  crude  steel 
and  33%  for  finished  products,  ~anging from  44%  for  hot-rolled 
sheet  to  23%  for  cold-rolled ·she~t  (Tables  16  and  17,  see  page  38). 
It  is  true  that  these  figures  do  not  take  into  account  closures  already 
planned  under  the  regulations  o~aid to  the  steel  industry,  but  so  far 
these  closures  are  insufficient  to  modify  the  results  significantly.  Any 
overestimate  in  the  declared  capacity  so  as  to  have  higher  quotas  under 
the crisis  scheme  would  not  be  of  a  sufficient volume  to  reduce  the  gravity 
of  the  situation. 
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BAlANCE  BETWEEN  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND  •  1985  - EUR  9 
Prod.  Prod.  Pr..od~  Estimated  Necess.ar  Pr-od.pot  Rate  of 
Products  Product~  potent.  potent.  Prod.  Prod.pot  annouced 
1980  1980  1981  1981  1985  1985  :9:!5  1980  (I) 
I.  CRUDE  STEEL  127,7  202,5  125,,  197,7  119,7  140,8  197 ,o  63,.1 
It.  fiNISHED  PRODUCTS  I 
Heavy  sections  8,4  15,7  8,5  16,0  7,2  9,0  15,6  53,5 
Light  sectlons  !0,9  18,1  9,5  18,3  9,7  12,,  19.~  6o,, 
Concrete  reinforcing 
rounds  8,7  12,2  7,4  13,0  7,5  9.  4  12,4  71 ,2 
Wire  rod  10,8  19.,  10,5  19,5  u,o  n. s  19,7  56,6 
Strip  6,0  11,5  5,2  10,9  4,9  6,1  10,7  52,2 
of  ..,h; ch  EX  SPEC ,f1iLL  ( 4,3)  (7, 9)  <3,4)  (7,  1)  (2,5)  (3,1)  (6,5)  (54,8) 
Hot  rolled  sheet  &  plat  12,6  27,6  13,0  27,6  12,5  15,6  27.9  45,7 
(2)' 
of  which  EX  SPEC  .M.~L  (9, 7)  ( 19, 2)  (10,4)  (19,01  (7,5)  (9,4)  {19,0)  (50,7) 
Cold  rolled  sheet  &  plat~  26,2  44,4  26,0  44,0  28,1  35,1  45.5  59,1 
TOTAL  (3)  8},6  148,5  80,,  149,2  80,9  101.,1  151,3  56,3 
TII.  WIDE  STRIP  45,)  72,9  46,5 
I  73,4  51,5  64, 4  76,5  62, I 
of  wh\c.h  Colts  Fl'l\·  .PI"'vd.  11,9)  { 17' 2)  (14,1l· (18,6)  (12,9)  ( 16, 1)  <l9,5)  <69,4 I/ 
'  I 
(1)  Assumir.g  a  rate  of  utilizati~n of  OS  A.  for  crude  steel  and  80  4  for  finished  rolled protlucts 
(})  Includ1flg  strip  and  h;:.t  she('t  from  co1ts 
OJ  r~ot  inclu·j1ng  coiLs  f-.11 .rryd. 
PRODUClS 
Co1ls  as  finished  prod'.Jcts 
Strip  (1) 
Cold-rolted  she-et 
TOTAL 
of  total strip production. 
c 
0 
0  ·::. 
~ 
> 
~ c 
0  e 
1,00 
(1)  so 
(2)  40  of  total  hot-rolled  snee-t' production. 
51,5 
c 
ce~  '1:1  _  .... 
....  I)  ... 
~ ,  c 
~'0~ 
....  0  ... 
~ L  0 
z  0.  c. 
16,1 
-'  0 ·- .  "  "' , 
66,2 
TABLE  16 
<'000  000  to  nr~ 
uti lizatlon  urplus  capacityf 
I 985  ! 
1981  i 
1985  : 
Tonnage  ,. 
I  : 
63,3  8l18  56,2  ?8, 5  1 
I 
53,2  46,2  6,6  42 ,J 
51,9  i ;o,o  1. 3  J1,6 
57 ,o I  tiO,s  3,0  24, 2 
54,0 I  55,s  5,9  29,9 
47,6  4',;,8  4,6  .:.J,O  I 
<48,ol I  oa  51  (3,4)  ( )2. J) 
'  '  47,1  i  44,8,  12, 3  .4 4,1 
(54,7>1{38,5)  {9,6)  ! :c,s) 
59,o  61 ,a  10,,  l2,9 
I 
53,7  ~3, 5  51),2  :;3,2 
63,4  67' 3  , 2,1  15,8 I 
(76,2}  <G6,  2J  ( 3,4)  ( 17 ,-) : 
I 
I 
17,4 
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9-steel  research  anc  cevelopment. 
Technological  progress,  arising  from  the  successful  exploitation  of 
research  and  development  effort,  has  made  a  major  contribution  to  the 
advanc~ment  and  to  the  growth  of  the  steel  industry  worldwide  over 
the  past  two  to  three  decades.  The  economies  of  scale  obtained  from 
large-volume  blast  furnaces,  the  introduction  of  basic  oxygen  steelmaking 
with  its  high  productivity,  the  replacement  of  conventional  ingot 
casting  by  continuous  CJ~ting and  the  automation  of  production 
processes  using  computers  are  all  outstanding  examples  of  the  way  in 
which  new  technology  has  Lead  to  major  economic  benefits  and  improve-
ments  in  the  quality  of  steel  plant  products. 
However,  the  ~xtent  to  which  productive  efficiency  in  the  industry 
has  benefited  from  these  advances  has  varied  considerably  with  Japanese 
steel  manufacturers  surpassing  their  major  competitors  in  Europe  and 
North  America  in  many  key  aspects  of  producfion  and  processing  as  welt 
as  in  product  development. 
The  impressive  progress  made  in  ~apan has  been  due,  in  large  part,  to 
the  increasingly  significant  innovative  contributions  that  have  been 
mode  by  1ts  industry  to  steelmaking  since  the  late  1960
1s.  Undoubt~dly, 
some  of  the  factors  responsible  for  this  surge  in  technological  progress 
were  the  economic  aims  and  polici~s of  government  and  management,  the 
stimulus  of  extremely  rapid  expansion  in  production  <22  million  tonnes 
in  1960  to  117  million  tonnes  in  1974)  to  meet  growing  demand  along  with 
an  ability  to  adapt  quickly  to  changing  world  conditions. 
Mor~ recently  the  tortunes  of  the  st~el  industry  worldwid~ have  been 
changed  markedly  by  the  econom~c  recession  that  followed  the  1973-1974 - 48·-
oil crisis  and  which  still persists.  The  consequences  have  been 
particularly  harsh  1n  the  Community  highlighting  structural  weak-
nesses  and  reduced  international  competitiveness. 
It  is evident  that  the  steel  industry  in  Europe  ~s  ~ell  as  in other 
advanced  countries  is  in  a  new  period  in  its development.  Thus,  in 
attempting  to  forecast  trends  in  research  and  technological  progress 
it is  necessary  to  recognise  this  changing  situation  in  which  most 
of  the  early  factors  underlying  the  period of  rapid progress  seen 
over  the  past  thirty  years  no  longer  apply  e.g.  strong  economic 
growth  and  low  energy  costs.  Therefore,  there  is  ample  reason  to 
expect  that  the  improvement  of  existing  and  the  development  of 
new  technologies  will  remain  an  extremely  active  and  competitive 
area  whereby  all  major  steel  producing  countries  will  strive  to 
strengthen  their  competitiveness. 
Within  the  forseeablc  future  no  dramatic  change  in  iron  and  steel-
making  technology  is  envisaged  and  progress,  for  the  most  part, 
'  . 
will  be  gradual  and  incremental.  Consequ~ntly, it  is  realistic  to 
expect  that  the  industry  will  remain  dependent  on  the  traditional 
blast  furnace  - basic  oxygen  furnace  production  method  (and  thus  on 
t<•i..ln'l  c:n.d)  ll'i  thr.  m.lin  mr.m!;  of  r.tet~l  mnnuf.1cturr.,  alonq  with  thr. 
scrap-electric  arc  furnac~  route.  While  industriaL· research  will  be 
concerned  primarily  with  improving  these  existing production  routes 
through  optimization  and  better  control,  longer-term effort  will  include 
more  speculative  projects  on  the  technical  and  economic  feasibility 
of  radically  new  processes  for  iron  and  steel  production. 
In  contributing  to  improved  competitiveness  and  to  the  modernisation 
and  rcstructing  of  st~clmaking  in  the  Community,  research  and  develop• 
mcnt  will  have  the  following  important  objectives: - ~9 -
- reduce  costs  and  enhance  productivity 
-up-grade pro?uct  quality 
- minimise  capital  costs  and  capital  expenditure 
- improve  the  performance  of  products  and  extend  the  range  of  steel 
~ 
utilisation. 
Some  of  the  areas  where  research  will  be  active over  the  medium-term  are  outlined 
below. 
The  problems  related  - dir~ctly or  indirectly- to  energy  will  have  a  major  impact 
on  the  technological  needs  of  the  steel  industry  influencing  production  methods, 
fhe  markets  for  steel  products  and  the  types  of  steel  that  will  be  required 
to  satisfy  these  markets.  Indeed,  the  fact  th~t.energy accounts  for  some  30X 
of  the  cost  of  steelmaking  itself  makes  this  a  profitable  area  for  process  research 
and  development  work.  ., 
In  production,  the  two  major  issues  will  continue  to  be  energy  economy  and 
increased  flexibility  in  the  use  of  different  energy  types.  In  connection  with 
the  latter,  a  major  effort  will  be  directed  at  shifting steel  plant  energy 
'  requirements  from  oil  and  natural  gas  to  higher  coal  percentages  and  at  reducing 
the  consumption  of  more  costly  coking  coals., 
Coal  injection  systems  provide  an  attractive means  of  replacing  heavy  fuel  oil 
as  an  injectant  in  the  blast  furnace  and  their  wider  adoption  will  call  for  further 
research.  Coal  injection  in  basic ·oxygen  steelmaking  will  also  be  investigated 
aimed  at  increasing  allowable  scrap  rates  and  thereby  take  advantage  of  market 
fluctuations  in  scrap prices.  Reduced  coke  rates  can  be  expected  from  the 
improved  operation  and  control  of~the blast  furnace  resulting  from  a  better  under-
st~nding of  such  aspects  as  the  cohesive  zone  while  the  search  for  methods  to 
produce  high-quality  coke  from  low-grade  coals  will  continue. 
Interesting prospects  are  offered  by  the  adoption  of  plasma  gas  heaters  in  iron  and 
steel  production;  ~hile this  technology  is  in  the  initial  stages  of  development 
research  to-date  indicates  that  the  application of  plasma ·heating  in  the  blast - 50  -
furnac~ will  reduce  significantly  coke  requirements  as  well  as  raise  producti-
vity. 
In  the  area  of  energy  conservation  there  are  a  number  of  technical  approaches 
to  the  problem  which  include  the  recovery  of  the  latent  and  sensible  heat  of 
basic  oxygen  converter  .. exhaust  gases,  the  sensible  heat  of  converter  slags  and 
I 
the  more  effective utilisation of  by-product  ~ses within  the  steel plant.  In 
rolling  and  finishing,  energy  saving  may  be  achieved  by  adopting  direct-rolling 
and  hot  charging  but  the  extension  of  these  practices will  depend  on  the 
dr.v~lorm~nt  of  on-line  hot  inspection  and  repair  systems  to  meet  strinu~nt 
surface quality  requirements.  Furthermore,  the  preheating  of  electric  arc  furnace 
,scrap charges  using  the  sensible  heat  of  waste  furnace  gases  with  or  without 
supplementary  fuel  combustion  provides  a  valuable  means  to economise  on  electrical 
energy  and  to  improve  plant  productivity. 
It  should  be  noted  that  in  this  area,  many  of  the  necessary  technologies  are 
available  so  that  further  research  work  will  be  largely  preoc~upied with  their 
improvrmC'nt  nnd  t'xtr-n~;ion. 
The  adoption  of  continuous  casting  is  another  established means  of  achieving 
major  energy  economies  and  it  is  envisaged  that  production potential  in  the 
Community  will  reach  110  n1illion  tonnes'by  1985  i.e.  59i.  of  total  steel  production 
potential.  Research  in  this  area  will  be  dominated  by  increasing  product  quality 
requirements  as  well  as  the  need  to  raise  plant  productivity.  Horizontal  continuous 
casting  with  its  lower  investment  costs will  remain  an  active area  of  development. 
Progress  in  automation,  mechanisation  and  robotics  have  been  quite  startling  in 
various  industrial  sectors  in  recent  years  e.g.  au~omobile industry,  and 
increasing  emphasis  must  be  devoted  to  their exploitation  in  steelmaking. 
Priority will  need  to  be  given,  1or  example,  to  the  wider  application of 
automation  and  to  the  development  of  more  technically  advanced  computer  control 
systems  directed  at  improved  equipment  utilisation,  enhanced  and  more  consistent 
product  quality,  decreased  mnnufacturing  costs  and  improved  1nterconn~ct1on 
between  different  production  stages e.g.  continuous  casting  machine  and 
rolling mill.  Overall  progress  here will  be  linked  to  improvements  in  instrument-
ation  for  monitoring  and  inspection  as  well  as  for  measurement  and  control. - 51  -
In, addition  to  th~  refer~nc~s  alr~ady made  to  cok~  anoth~r  &!p~ct of  raw 
materials  concerns  scrap  which  is  particularly valuable  because  of  th~ great 
differences  in  energy  requirements  for  melting  scrap  as  compared  with  the 
reduction  of  iron ore.  It  is  apparent  that  most  short-to-medium  term  techno-
logical  changes  will  tend  to  increa~~ the  use  of  scrap;  these  changes  include 
the  growing  use  of  electric  arc  furnaces  and  continuous  casti,.g  as  well  as  thE.' 
modification  of  basic  oxygen  furnaces  to  ihcrease  the  proportion  of  scrap  charged. 
In  addition,  demand  for  high-performance  specialty  Jteels  i~  growing  which 
incorporate  higher  proportions  of  alloy  and  other  matcria~s  that  make  scrap 
recovery  difficult.  These  developments  have  im._ortant  implications  for  the 
future  demand  and  availability of  scrap  and  t(Jus  its price. 
Future  options  that  might  be  used  to  overcome  possible  scrap  supply  problems 
include  expanding  the  use  of  sponge  iron  produced  by  direct  reduction.  This 
should  serve  as  a  stimulus  to  further  research  and  pilot  scale demonstration 
aimed  at  the  devt'lopment  of  more  economically  attractive  as  well  as  environmrntnlly 
acc~ptable processes  for  sponge  iron  production  in  the  Community  ;  these  would 
need  to  be  based  on  the  direct  utilisation of  coal  or  the  combination  of  direct 
reduction  and  coal  gasification  rather  than  on  costly  natural  gas  as  the  reductant. 
An  increasingly  important  requirement  in  steelmaking  is  for  plant  and  equipment 
to  have  greater  flexibility  to  meet  a  broader  range  of  product  specification5. 
Engineering  has  a  vital  contribution  to  make  in  this  respect  to  enable 
installations  to  handle  frequent  changes  in  production  schedules  white,  at 
the  snm~  time,  b~ing capable  o1  ochieving  minimuu1  production  costs.  An  additior1"l 
challenge  to  development  work  ~n.this field  will  be  the  need  to  upgrade  existing 
installations  for  better productivity,  less  maintenance  and,  agai~,  more 
flexibility. 
'· 
In  steel  product  technology  the  progress  will  again  be  incremental  rather  than 
dramatic  and  some  of  the  factors  that  will  influence  future  developments  are  : 
-need  to meet  increasingly  stringent  user  requirements  with  regard  to 
durability,' reliability,  uniformity  and  cos.ts  ; 
- need  to  make  products  that  are better  adapted  to specific  applications  and  to 
produce  more  sophisticated  higher value  added  products  particularly  for  the 
needs  of  export  markets  ; - 52  -
- need  to acknowledge  and  to  respond  to  changes  both  in  steelmaking 
technology,and  in  the  pattern of  steel  consumption  where,  in domestic 
markets,  it  appears  that  there  will  be  a  sustained  or  even  modest 
growth  for  sheet  products  while  demand  for  long  products  will  fall 
(see  Section  11.3)  ; 
- need  to  meet  growing  competition  from  alternative materials  such  as 
aluminium  alloys  and  plastics particularly  in  such  key  user  sectors 
as  the  automobile  industry; 
-need for  even  closer  collaboration between  steel  producer  and  steel user 
in  order  to  establish  a  more  offensive  strategy  in  the  promotion  and 
development  of  new  and  existing markets. 
In  view  of  the  wide  diversity  of  steel  products  it  is difficult  to  single out, 
·priorities  but  it  is  thought  that  a  major  factor  affecting  developments  in this 
area  is  the  energy  shortage.  Steel  products' play  an  important  role  in  energy 
resource  exploitation  and  transport  (offshore  structures,  transmission  linepipe) 
and  in  energy  production  (electricity generation)  and  the  growing  needs  of  the 
energy  sector  will  place  greater  demands  on  steel.  Also,  high  strength  steel 
grades  will  provide  means  of  energy  saving, in  the  automotive  and  transport 
sectors  since  decreasing  vehicle  weight  leads  to  fuel  savings.  The  need  to 
extend  the  useful  life of  components  and  products,  which  is  another  aspect 
of  energy  conservation,  will  require  improvements  in  corrosion  resistance 
and  protection  <coatings)  of. p~o~ucts as  well  as  in  their  mechanical  properties. 
In  pJrallel  with  specific  product  dev~lopment, there  will  be  further  more  ba5ic 
work  undertaken  in  such  areas  as  strength  and  fracture  characteristics,  fabrica-
~ 
tion  techniques  (particularly welding  and  weldability),  formability,  high 
temperature  behaviour  and  the  structural  performance  of  steels.  The  better 
scientific  understanding  of  properties  derived  from  this  research  will  indicate 
how  improvements  may  be  achieved  in  addition  to  providing background  data  that 
will  aid  in engineering  design  and  in  establishing  international  codes, 
regulations  and  specifications. - 53  -
Whil~  th~  future  trends  in  re5e5rch  outlined  above  moy  well  find  brond 
acceptance,  there  remains  the  important  questi~n of  how  will  the  continuing 
difficult  financial  situation  in  the  industry  influence  research  funding 
and  the  rate  at  which  technological  progress  is  made. 
Firstly,  due  to  the  limited  availability  of  capital,  it  is  log1cat  to  expect 
that preference  will  be  given  to  investment  in  rt:!'W  tr.nrology \-!here  the  cost-benefit  is most 
favourable  and  lead  times are  relatively  short.  T~is  apprcarn  will  clearly 
influence  priorities  in  research  pldnning  and  e~  uurdge  prujcct~ ilimPd  ilt 
devising  capital  saving  technologies  e.g.  les~  ~ostly plant  and  equipment. 
Secondly,  the  prevailing  financial  climate  is  having  repercussions  on  the 
industry's  ability  to  support  an  adequate  Level  o~  research  and  development 
activity.  Estimates  of  funding  for  steel  research  show  that  expenditure  in 
the  Community  is,  on  average,  2.2  ECU/tonne  of  steel  output  compared  with 
2.7  ECU/tonne  in  the  USA  and  4.0  ECU/tonne  in  Japan.  Furthermore,  the  effecti-
vcne$5  of  this  lower  level  of  support  in  Europe  is  diminished  by  the  duplication 
of  effort  that  takes  place  in  research  at  the  national  Level. 
Against  this  background,  there  is  the  danger  that  the  rate  of  technological 
advance  and  thus  the  technological  competiLiveness  of  steelmaking  in  the 
Community  will  fall  behind  in  the  years  ahead  or  it will  become 
increasingly  dependent  on  lic~nces  and  know-how  purchased  from  foreign  sources. 
There  is  a  n~ed,  therefore,  for  the  Community's  steel  . 
indu~try  to  examine  the  scope  tl1~t  exists  for  greater  collaboration  on 
research  in  areas  where  questions  of  competition  and  commercially  sensitive 
issues  are  not  of  immediate  concern.  At  present  th~ most  extensive  cooperation 
occurs  within  the  ECSC  funded  programme  which  represents  somp  Rl.  of  thP  total  effort 
on  steel  research  in  the  Community. 
The  opportunities  for  improved  coordination  and  closer  collaboration  in  the 
steel  sector  are  believed  to  exist  in  more  fundamental  and  longer  term 
research  as  well· as  in  production  and  processing  ;  indeed  the  potential 
benefits  in  this  Latter  area  could  be  substantial  in  view  of  the  high  costs 
frequently  involved.  The  realisation of  this  goal  must  be  one  of  the  major 
challenges  facing  those  engaged  in  the  technical  affairs  of  the  Community's 
steel  industry  over  the  m~dium to  long  term. - 54  -
In  meeting  the  common  technological  needs  of  the  industry  continued 
support  will  be  given  by  the  Commission  to  research  and  development 
while  a  new  1nitiative on  pilot  scale projects  will  prov~de a  valuable 
and  necessary  stimulus  to  the  transfer  of  research  to  large  scale  demon-
stration and  ultimate  commercial~exploitation  • 
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A  .. GENERAL  HETHODOLOGY  FOR  THE  PREPARATION  OF  F:ORECASTS 
1.  The  following  have  been  prepared  for  the  Community  on  the  basis of  studies 
conducted  in each  country on  consumption  1n  the  user branches  between  1970 
and  1978. 
a)  A table of  steel  consumption  by  products  and  b,  sector  for  1978,  taken  as  the 
reference  year  for  forecasting  (ordinary  ste.•l  and  sre~ial steels). 
b)  Sectoral  tables  showing  the  trend  in  spec  .i.e  consumption  between  1970  and 
1977 for  each  type  of  product 
steel  consumption  kg  steel 
cs 
production  tonne  of  product 
·For  the  total  (EUR  9),  the  specific consumption  of  each  country has  been 
weighted  by  sectoral  production  each  year  between  1970  and  1977. 
c)  Series  of  activit~ indices,  by  user  sector,  using  a  statistical data  base 
recorded  in  the  form  of  time  series  and  managed  by  the  CRONOS  system.  These 
indices  based  on  1975  100 are  indices  of  value  added  at  factor  costs  and 
constant  prices.  For  three  sectors,  these  activity  indices were  calculated 
as  follows: 
+"other consumers":  production  indices  \~eighted  by  consumption  1n  1977 
+  "shipyards":  compensated  gross  registered  tonnage  indexes  (1  000) 
+  "manufacture  o£  tubes":  production  indices. 
2.  The  figures  given  for  1985  represent  the  trend  level  established  as  follows: 
a)  Forecasts  for  the  development  of  activity in  the  sectors  are  based  on 
the  relations  between  this activity  and  the  evolution expected  for  the 
period  1980-85  of  the  ma1n  macro-economic  variables: 
1.  GDP 
2.  Private  and  public  consumption 
3.  Gross  fixed  capital  formation 
4.  Industrial  production; 
These  macro-economic  trends  were  established_in  the  fifth medium-term 
economic  policy progranm1e  drafted  by  the  Commission  in cooperation with  the 
Nember  States; 
. I. Annex 
b)  Forecasts  of  consumption  by  products  are made  by  applying  to  the  activity 
of.the user  sectors  specific  steel  con~umption coefficients obtained  from 
the  historical  trend,  where  necessary corrected  in  accordance with  the 
latest developments. 
B.  EXPLANATORY  TABLE  OF  PRODUCTION  FORECASTS 
The  following  points  concerning  the  product  categories  1n  Tabla  8  sho11ld  be  noted: 
a)  There  has  been  no  independent  forecast  ~or coils  as  finished  products. 
Production for  1985  is established  by  assuming  that  the  breakdown  of  1981 
demand  amongst  heavy  and  light plate,  sheet  and  coils will  rema1n  unchanged. 
In the  light of  past  trends,  it is probable  that  this will  slightly 
underestimate  production but  the effect will not  be  significant.  I~ that 
case,  hot-rolled wide  strip production will  be  slightly overestimated  because 
of  the  increased  demand  for  sheet  or  light  and  heavy  plate owing·to  the 
fact  that more  material  is  lost  in  the  wcnking  of  these  products  than  in  the 
case of  coils as  finished  products. 
b)  Similarly,  the  forecast  for  concrete  reinforcing  round  production  1s  based 
-on  a  more  or less constant  share of  this product within  the  light  section 
category. 
c)  The  heavy  andlight  plate  and  sltcct  categories  include  hot  and  cold-rolled 
products.  The  following  table  shows  the  breakdown  between hot  and  cold-rolled 
sheet  and  plate,  once  ag~in assuming  that  the  structure will  remain  unchanged 
from  the previous  period.  Since  the. quantities  involved  are  very  small,  this 
distinction  is only of  interest for  the  accurate  calculation of  cold-rolled 
plate  and  sheet  demand. 
PRODUCTION  OF  PLATE  AND  SHEET  1974  TO  19d1  ~NQ 1985 
('000 000  tonnesl 
- -1v-!l~  PRODUCTS  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  ~~du  1981 
HEAVY  AND  LIGHT  PLATE 
-hot-rolled 
- cold-rolled 
SHEET 
- hot-rolled  . 
- cold-rolled 
TOTAL.  COLD-ROLLED  PLATE  AND  SHEET 
.rOTAL·HOT-ROLLED  PLATE  AND  SHEET 
17,575 
17,450 
-
0,125 
29,269 
1.),559 
28,710 
14,494  12,526  12,262 
14 '382  1  2,360  12,:::.97 
:J,112  C,168  0,165 
21,731  26' 706  27,374 
,1,291  .:,320  o,3vu 
21,440  26~4-~6  26,9134 
12,601  13,005  12,461 
12,.:.1o.  12,d22  1:,265 I 
0'  1 b 7  o, 183  :,  196 
21l,032  29,2413  16,332 
J,c.'54  0,451  ],335 
27,578  213,797  25,9971 
1 2' 839  12,3  I 
I 
12,626  '< '1  I  O,.?lJ  '  J 
~~,  ... 
26,102  28 ,3  I 
I 
0,340 
"··J 
lS,fo~  ~'-·9 
·-· 
::.,975  28,1 
12,966  12,5 